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Abstract
Though computational models typically assume all program steps execute flawlessly, that does not imply all steps are equally important if a failure should occur.
In the “Constrained Reliability Allocation” problem, sufficient resources are guaranteed for operations that prompt eventual program termination on failure, but those
operations that only cause output errors are given a limited budget of some vital
resource, insufficient to ensure correct operation for each of them.
In this dissertation, I present a novel representation of failures based on a combination of their timing and location combined with criticality assessments—a method
used to predict the behavior of systems operating outside their design criteria. I observe that strictly correct error measures hide interesting failure relationships, failure
importance is often determined by failure timing, and recursion plays an important
role in structuring output error. I employ these observations to improve the output error of two matrix multiplication methods through an economization procedure

vi
that moves failures from worse to better locations, thus providing a possible solution to the constrained reliability allocation problem. I show a 38% to 63% decrease
in absolute value error on matrix multiplication algorithms, despite nearly identical
failure counts between control and experimental studies. Finally, I show that efficient
sorting algorithms are less robust at large scale than less efficient sorting algorithms.
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have different x and y axes. See text for details. Reprinted from [1]. 129
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Glossary
approximate algorithms and computing

A computing technique in which programs

may return inaccurate results in return for the ability to complete a
computation under circumstances where a correct result is difficult
or impossible to obtain.
best-effort computing

A paradigm in which computational units try to improve the

current program state without working towards a complete and precisely correct solution.
Cf

Notation for a computation C running with failure pattern f .

correct mode

An operation’s expected computational behavior when there is no
failure.

criticality

A method for measuring the importance of a component in the context of a whole system.

criticality assessment

A technique for assessing algorithm operation criticality in

some context.
context

See program context



Notation for an i.i.d. error probability.

Glossary

xxiv

error economization

The purposeful redirection of resources from one part of a

computation to another with the goal of decreasing output errors
measured via an error measure.
error measure

Any function that accepts both a correct and an incorrect program
output and returns a scalar difference between them.

execution index

A count of the number of times an operation or method has been
called during a single program run.

experiment object

A Java object that has an experiment method that runs a pro-

gram and a score method that acts as an error measure.
failure dynamics

The interlocking set of relationships between correct and failed
operations and the output of a program.

failure interface
failure method

See method level failure interface.
A method that implements a failure mode and must have the same
signature as the original correct method except that it accepts an
additional input for a random number generator and has a signifier,
such as ‘Rand’, appended to its method name.

failure mode

A description of an operation’s behavior during a failure, used to
inject failures into a program.

failure pattern

A record of when and where each failure in a program occurs.

failure pattern distribution

A probability distribution over the set of all possible

failure patterns.
failure point

A tuple of (execution index, operation) that uniquely defines a
single failure during a single program run.

Glossary

failure shape

xxv

The criticality distribution on a field of failure points produced
by a criticality assessment.

fault injection

The simulation of hardware and software failures that can then be
be used to test program behavior under faulty conditions.

fault tolerance

The silent correction of hardware or software faults at run time such
that the high level algorithm or user never observes the fault.

fault-intolerance/fault-tolerance

A paradigm that combines fault tolerance tech-

niques that silently correct failures with fault intolerance that kills
a program or process whenever a failure is not corrected.
field of failure points

A set of failure points over one or more operations and

execution indexes—large enough to contain most possible runs of
an algorithm at some input scale. Each point in the field has an
associated criticality.
f ∼F

Notation for a failure pattern f drawn from a failure pattern
distribution F .

f ∧ K∗

Notation for a failure pattern f , modified so that operation K is
operating in its failure mode.

input generator

A generator that produces random input objects.

input object

An object with a randomize method that acts as an input generator.

K∗

Notation for operation K operating in its failure mode.

leverage

The average criticality of all failure points with a criticality above
the median criticality divided by the average criticality of those
beneath the median.
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xxvi

method level failure interface

A Java method annotated with an ‘@Randomize’ tag

and with an accompanying failure method. At runtime faults are
injected into the program by calling the failure method instead of
the original correct mode method.
program context

Paired with a specific program, a context is a list of operations
that can fail in the program and their failure modes, an input
generator for the program, and an error measure on the program.

presortedness

A method for measuring how close a list is to sorted, a kind of error
measure.

quantified correctness

Any measure of error on a program, in some context, such

that the number of possible output error values grows with a function that is in ω(C) in program input size.
scalable robustness

The property of a program, in some context, such that the

error of the program approaches zero as the number of failures in
the program approaches zero while the input size of the program
approaches infinity.
theories of robustness

Computational theories that relate deviations in program in-

puts and operations, compared to some expected baseline for either,
to a measure of error on the program output.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis I present a method for measuring operation importance on failureprone hardware, providing a novel perspective on the computational process and
paving the way for robustness resource economizations that improve the behavior of
programs in fallible environments. This work grows out of a concern for problems
introduced by silent data corruptions (SDC) which are observed both in large scale
and embedded computing environments [4, 5]. These problems call into question
paradigms that rely on the removal of failures for computational success and lead to
a lack of understanding concerning the impact of failures when they are inevitable.

1.1

Background

At the beginning of the computer revolution computational devices were unreliable.
Based on vacuum tubes and electromechanical switches, they could break down and
corrupt a computation after a very short period of time [6]. It has become a cliche in
computer science that the word ‘bug’ entered the lexicon when an insect landed on
Harvard University’s Mark II calculator and caused the computer to glitch. While
the word ‘bug’ can be found applied to tiny technical errors in a system or engine
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as early as the 19th century [7], it is nevertheless true that one moth’s unfortunate
encounter with an Mark II electronic panel is one of its first uses in the field of
computer science [8]. Failures like this were common for early computer scientists,
who placed a lot of effort into building machines of sufficient accuracy to provide
useful results.
In response, the pioneers of our field developed a paradigm of ruthless correctness
to combat hardware failures. In 1948 John von Neumann gave a series of lectures in
which he explained how this paradigm grew out of engineers’ lack of understanding
about errors and opposed it to the behavior of computations in natural systems:
Natural organisms are sufficiently well conceived to be able to operate
even when malfunctions have set in. They can operate in spite of malfunctions, and their subsequent tendency is to remove these malfunctions...
[In an artificial automaton any malfunction] represents a considerable
risk that some generally degenerating process has already set in within
the machine. It is, therefore, necessary to intervene immediately, because
a machine which has begun to malfunction has only rarely a tendency
to restore itself, and will more probably go from bad to worse... With
our artificial automata we are moving much more in the dark than nature appears to be with its organisms... [We are] much more “scared” by
the occurrence of an isolated error and by the malfunction which must
be behind it. Our behavior is clearly that of over-caution, generated by
ignorance [6].
Von Neumann’s solution was to combine the natural and artificial paradigms at
different computational levels. Computer engineers would assemble modules composed of multiple copies of fallible components. If the results of a supermajority of
the components were the same then the answer they provided would be accepted.
This allowed for masking some failures as in the ‘natural automata’ paradigm. If
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there was no supermajority agreement, however, then the result was considered invalid, a fault was detected, and the whole computation was thrown out or rewound
to the last correct state, and a human was informed of the error in keeping with the
methods for correcting ‘artificial automata’. Assuming independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) failures amongst the components, this method could drive the
module’s undetected failure rate to an arbitrarily low value by growing the number
of redundant modules, given that per component failure rates were below a very
conservative 16% [9].

1.1.1

From Fault Tolerance to Approximate Computing

While the two-level failure correction method introduced by von Neumann did not
have a name in his day, today we call it the Fault-intolerant/fault-tolerant paradigm
(fault-tolerance) [10, 11]. Computations are designed first to avoid failures whenever
possible and terminate on any hardware failure that may introduce a software fault,
hence the fault-intolerance, while striving to preserve and protect a fragile core of
correct computation by re-performing and correcting failures that may occur at run
time using fault tolerance techniques. These methods may be based in hardware,
such as [12–15] where, for example, special chip designs allow for multi-threaded
result checking, or they may be in software such as [16–19] where extra instructions
are added to the normal software flow to ensure correct execution. This paradigm
has allowed for the construction of the architectures, built around ‘guaranteed’ deterministic hardware, that have ‘guaranteed’ deterministic execution.
However, fault tolerance/intolerance tends to create a bifurcation in the way
computer and software engineers think about computational processes. Programs
are often written with large nonlinearities where the manipulation of a few bits of
data can greatly impact final outcomes. Software engineers can remain ignorant
of how these nonlinearities are impacted by failures that occur at a lower level as
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those failures are expected to disappear under a contract of hardware-software stack
determinism that relies on ensuring that data looks correct. However, this subjects
the system to arbitrary impact due to SDCs since these failures, by definition, ‘look
correct’ [20].
While these techniques work for the worst problems at today’s computing scales,
solutions are often achieved through a slow evolutionary procedure in which failures
must first become a problem to be solved before they can be solved. Many times,
this game of catch-up works fine. Occasionally, it does not [21]. Sometimes, the
cure is almost worse than the sickness, demanding immense growth in resources
to suppress only occasional failures as in process replication or checkpoint-restart
in high performance computing (HPC) environments. When implemented naively,
these techniques can lead to massive increases in energy usage making it more difficult
to meet important environmental and energy cost goals [22–24]. However, as long as
we do not understand failure such methods are necessary.
Power wastage is also a pressing problem for embedded computations. To tackle
this problem, researchers working with these devices are considering hardware techniques, such as voltage over-scaling, that trade accuracy for lower hardware energy
use [25]. Conceivably, in the future, chips will present a reliability-efficiency interface
that may be used by economizing software to regulate chip resource on a per program counter tick basis or redirect less important computational steps to a “green”
computational core that uses less energy [26]. However, these developments that
drop computational determinism must eventually lead to a reconsideration of what
it means for a program to be “correct”.

1.1.2

Best-Effort Computing

One approach to dealing with computational correctness and computing beyond determinism is best-effort computing [27, 28], in which hardware promises only that
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its operations will typically be correct, while guaranteeing neither full correctness
nor any specific distribution of failures. One encouraging step in this direction
are the fields of approximate algorithms and computing—computing techniques in
which programs may return possibly inaccurate results rather than generate a guaranteed accurate result, in return for the ability to complete a computation under
circumstances where a correct result is difficult or impossible to obtain [5, 29–31].
It has already shown promise in applications such as approximate video processing
(e.g. [32, 33]), where even large failures may produce only minor output errors, such
as periodic blips on the screen.
Approximate computing, however, sometimes requires that technology choices be
evaluated only in a whole-systems context, risking chicken-and-egg problems if actual
end-use data is expected to inform the system’s design. For example, past energy
conservation approximation techniques have relied on detailed hardware knowledge
to limit their search space when finding the best economization for a given system
application [33]. The application of approximate computing to general computations
requires techniques that can provide economizations outside of a particular hardware
context.
A priori theoretical analysis of algorithms could lead to some useful conclusions
about algorithmic behavior in the face of undetected failures. This is true of efficiency
analysis, which can sometimes be re-purposed for analyzing algorithm robustness. In
some cases, these analyses are not that difficult. For example, we can prove that the
first N comparisons of quicksort are the most important because of how the first
pivot moves numbers across half the list length on average, while pivots later in
the algorithm tend not to move numbers as far. However, many theoreticians are
not focused on questions of failure dynamics—the interlocking set of relationships
between correct and failed operations and the output of an algorithm, but rather
seek to ensure absolutely correct outputs within some error bounds, in keeping with
the fault tolerance paradigm.
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The pursuit of correctness certainly seems respectable, but it implies that all errors are equally bad, no matter how harmless or catastrophic. A better way is to
switch from a paradigm of strict correctness to one of quantified correctness which
allows for measuring continuous or nearly continuous degrees of output error. Standardized error measures can be developed for common object classes, in the same
way that other methods are integrated into objects today. For example, when sorting
lists a presortedness measure (e.g. [34, 35]) can be re-appropriated to measure the
degree of successful sorting in the final outcome. These measures can then be used
on many list-like objects. Similarly, absolute difference measures can be employed
to judge the error on algorithms that produce integer, floating point, and matrix
outputs.
Strict correctness presents us with a weak feedback signal for computational error.
Abandoning strict correctness may seem like a high price to pay; indeed, the faulttolerance paradigm will eventually lead to the evolutionary embedding of knowledge
concerning failure within the code itself. However, we cannot say how efficient that
process will be, or if it will ever completely illuminate the darkness surrounding
computational error that von Neumann spoke of so long ago.

1.2

Problem Statement

Since traditional software engineering assumes deterministic execution, there is a gap
in knowledge concerning:
• which operations in a program are most critical to obtain high-quality results,
• what can be done to ensure successful program operation in resource constrained environments, and
• how the properties of a program, such as its efficiency or the ordering of its
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operations, interact with its robustness in the face of failures.
To answer these questions I present the “constrained reliability allocation” problem. In this problem sufficient resources are guaranteed for operations that may
prompt eventual program termination or infinite loops on failure while operations
that only cause output errors are given a limited budget of some vital resource. It is
then the job of some economization procedure to distribute these resources so that
program output is minimally damaged.
Therefore, the contributions of this dissertation are threefold:
1. it quantifies the importance of operation failures in a traditionally deterministic
group of algorithms on steps that appear to lie somewhere between ‘negligible
impact’ and ‘program critical’,
2. it provides a framework and method for improving the performance of deterministic algorithms in environments where there are not sufficient resources for
guaranteed deterministic operation, and
3. it develops a deeper understanding of the relationship between algorithmic efficiency and robustness using a newly developed scalable robustness paradigm.
Now we turn to the notions of computational robustness and error measurement
that form this dissertation’s foundation.

1.3

Conceptual Framework

This study grows out of ideas related to criticality, fault tolerance, fault injection,
quantified correctness, approximate computing, error economization, and theories
of efficiency and robustness. I seek to use criticality, measured through quantifiedcorrectness evaluations of error on fault-injected programs, to show how approximate
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computations on faulty hardware can be be economized. Using the insights thus
gained, I then propose a theory of computational robustness that stands in contrast
to those posed by the fault tolerance paradigm.
I will touch, briefly, on each of these concepts here, but a more in-depth exploration of each subconcept can be found in Section 2.
Criticality is a method for measuring the importance or value of a component
in the context of a system [36–39]. A simple example of criticality might be the
minimum throughput on some node in a flow graph experiencing a max flow event or
the change in device state caused by receiving or not receiving, a particular message.
It can be viewed as a statistical derivative, measuring the expected change in the
output of a system given a change in some internal component.
Fault Tolerance/Intolerance, as explained, is the bimodal paradigm whereby failures are either suppressed through some statistical method, or alternatively, if they
are detected but uncorrected they cause a system crash or restart.
Fault Injection is a technique whereby computational operations are modified
at run time to behave differently than expected. Faults can be injected either at
the hardware level, by manually adding components capable of changing electrical
states, or at the software level through various techniques with virtual machine fault
injection being a popular technique [40].
Quantified Correctness means evaluating program or system performance in a
manner that goes beyond the ‘is correct/is not correct’ level. It also includes stepping
beyond measuring the simple probability of correct program responses. Rather,
under quantified correctness a single program run is capable of having error responses
that range over a large number of different values with a cardinality that is ω(C) in
functions of program input size.
Approximate Algorithms and Computing, as previously explained, are computing
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frameworks where program outputs are not expected to be correct, but are rather
allowed to vary from the correct value within some error range. At first approximate
algorithms were applied to solving problems with no known feasible solution, such
as NP-complete computations [41], but recently approximate computing has been
applied to situations where hardware level errors are allowed to percolate through
the computational stack all the way to program output [42].

Error Economization is the purposeful redirection of resources from one part of
a computation to another with the goal of decreasing output errors measured via an
error measure.

Theories of Efficiency account for the amount of resources required to successfully
implement a computing strategy for solving some problem. They are very common
in the computing world. The big-O, big-Θ, and big-Ω notations and their attendant
concepts come to mind. There are also Theories of Robustness that account for the
output error of a program given some error on program inputs or distribution of
failures on program operations. However, these are less generalized and famous than
those concerning computational efficiency. An example of such a theory is program
continuity found in [43] where the authors propose that a program in continuous if
a small change in the input leads to a small change in the output. Alternatively,
in [44] the authors present a model of robustness which focuses on δ, the number of
allowed failures per unit time.

Using this framework it becomes possible for us to ask some serious questions
and hypothesize about the failure dynamics of programs subject to the constrained
reliability allocation problem.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses

A full and complete consideration of failure dynamics is outside the scope of this
study. When programs begin to fail there are many strange phenomena that can
occur, including some failures that improve program performance or combinations
of failures that do far greater or less damage than can otherwise be accounted for by
their individual impact [45]. However, there are some general questions about these
dynamics and their relationship to computational robustness and efficiency that I do
ask:

1.4.1

How do Measures of Correctness Hide or Uncover Interesting Failure Dynamics Inside Algorithms?

Any study about failure dynamics should be concerned with the method of measuring error on the output of an algorithm. While I have indicated that quantified
correctness is a possible path forward for understanding how computations fail, it
does not seem to be obvious to the field that quantified correctness measures should
be employed when judging program performance. This opposition, traditional allor-nothing correctness against quantified correctness suggests two subquestions.
How do all-or-nothing error measures impact the observed failure dynamics of an algorithm?
To answer this question, this dissertation evaluates algorithmic failure dynamics with error measures that use a strictly correct evaluation procedure to judge
performance as a baseline on sorting algorithms.
How do error measures that allow for partial credit on continuous or
multi-step scales, such as quantified correctness measures, impact our
understanding of algorithmic failure dynamics?
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After measuring a subset of failure dynamics with all-or-nothing error measures
this dissertation empirically examines both sorting algorithms and multiplication
algorithms with quantified correctness measures.
My primary hypothesis is that strict correctness measures often hide an algorithm’s failure dynamics while quantified correctness measures expose interesting
failure dynamics. This is due to the tendency of strict error measures to treat all
failures equally and mask the failure’s impact on algorithmic output. This hypothesis will be falsified if strictly correct error measures produce similar failure dynamics
results as quantified correctness measures or if the failure dynamics exposed by quantified correctness measures are otherwise uninteresting.

1.4.2

How Are an Algorithm’s Failure Dynamics Related to
the Algorithm’s Known Behavior?

I hypothesize that the failure dynamics observed when using continuous error measures may be related to the known behaviors and properties of those algorithms.
These behaviors include algorithmic recursion, previous understandings about algorithmic reliance on specific operations, the location of algorithmic loops, and understandings about algorithmic space and time complexity. This hypothesis can be
falsified if no discernible pattern relating to known algorithmic behaviors is found in
algorithm failure dynamics data.

1.4.3

Can Failure Dynamics Analysis Improve Algorithmic
Performance in Resource Constrained Environments?

Much of the analysis of efficiency in algorithms and computational systems assumes
that enough resources will be available to provide a ‘correct’ result given algorithmic
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correctness and then seeks algorithms that decrease the number of resources necessary to obtain that result. However, there are some situations where even the most
efficient algorithms consume too many resources to allow for strictly-correct program
solutions. This dissertation focuses on circumstances where there are not sufficient
resources to perform every algorithmic operation correctly but where it may, instead,
be possible to move resources to those computational steps with the greatest impact.
I hypothesize that a revealing analysis of failure dynamics within a particular algorithm should make it possible to leverage an economy of error to increase algorithm
performance in a resource constrained environment. This hypothesis is falsified for
some economy of error if we find conditions where a detailed failure dynamic analysis
cannot be paired with an economy of error to improve algorithmic performance.

1.4.4

Which Operations Respond Well to This Method?

There are some operations and computational components that are vital for a program or system to produce partially correct outputs. Further, it seems that in the
future advanced scheduling systems will be able to pull some operations out of the
program stream and send them to less reliable hardware while ensuring that critical
operations receive greater attention.
This dissertation hypothesizes that algorithms respond well to this method when
it is applied to those operations that make up the bulk of the algorithm’s run time,
but where each are responsible for a small part of the program output. Examples
include additions in multiplication, searches in fractal image compression, graph
steps in graph search algorithms, ray traces in a ray tracer, backpropagation steps
used for stochastic gradient descent, and comparisons in sorting algorithms.
Between these operations, I hypothesize that there must also be some leverage—
operation failures must have a differential impact on the output based on when
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and where they occur. A further hypothesis is that this leverage can be found when
algorithm uses a mathematical or programmatic trick to increase its efficiency against
some brute-force solution that is less efficient.
This hypothesis is falsified if algorithms without leverage, or that make use of
brute force solutions, are impacted in some strong manner by the error economization
procedure.

1.5

Procedures

In this work I focus on three traditional computer science problems: sorting, scalar
multiplication, and matrix multiplication. For each problem I pick out a common
computational step that is shared by all the algorithms in that problem set and
inject faults into that step. I then measure the deviation between fault-injected and
non-fault injected program runs to evaluate program failure criticality.
I then run an experiment where all computational operations subject to fault
injection from step 1 are failed using an i.i.d. error model. Using the average output
error from this i.i.d. experiment as a baseline result for failures on each algorithm
and problem, I also run an experiment where I fail the least critical operations at
double the failure rate while armoring the most important operations against any
failures. I apply this experiment only to the multiplication algorithms. This is my
error economization result.
Finally, using insights gained from the evaluation of program failure criticality
on the sorting algorithms, I present a theory of robustness at scale that suggests a
connection between algorithmic efficiency and algorithmic robustness.
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Thesis Outline

In the next chapter I present background material concerning the techniques and
ideas explored throughout this work, especially those exemplified by each of the
concepts in Section 1.3. Chapter 3, building on work available in [1], presents a
detailed description of the specific model and methods used throughout this work
to answer the questions found in Section 1.4. Next, Chapters 4 and 5, based on
work first explored in [1, 2], present the results of empirical studies on criticality and
error economization in both sorting and multiplication algorithms. Chapter 6, based
on work first published in [3], is a general theoretical view of error and robustness
through the specific lens of sorting algorithms that builds upon empirical observations made in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 7 I consider how the concrete choices
made in the development of this work limit its scope and present recommendations,
speculations, and conclusions.

15

Chapter 2
Related Work

As discussed in Section 1.3 there are a number of concepts that touch on or underpin
the work I present in this thesis. These include criticality, fault tolerance, fault
injection, quantified correctness, approximate computing, error economization, and
theories of robustness. Here I summarize work in each of these areas.

2.1

Criticality

Criticality analysis has a long history as a method for understanding failures in
industries working with finite engineered machines. While this analysis is taken to be
generalizable, its application is often limited to industries where safety is important,
such as medicine, cyber-physical systems, and travel [36–39].
In these analyses a bottom-up approach that is similar to those found in this dissertation is often used in which known failure modes are assigned to engineered components and simulations of whole-system errors are produced by searching through
a space of failures on each low-level component [36]. Such analyses have also been
used to evaluate system susceptibility to malicious attacks, such as the transportation
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network analysis found in [37] where the authors propose a criticality ratio measure
that may be useful as an error measure for criticality evaluation in graph-based algorithms. Authors have also examined resource economies that use system criticality
to balance real time operations [38, 39].
In each of these works criticality analysis is performed on projects that affect dayto-day living conditions. Even when these analysis are aimed at electronic compute
systems, however, they are most likely to be developed for those systems that will
have major ‘real world’ impact, such as the schedule balancing work for Boeing found
in [46].
Many authors, however, move beyond criticality analysis to analyze operation,
code, and system importance more generally. A related line of research in pure
computing lies in sensitivity evaluations that often focus on the affects of system
perturbations on whole system performance. In [47] the authors introduce time-based
system perturbations which produce system performance degradation and then they
evaluate mean time to recovery for the system as a sensitivity metric. Alternatively,
in [48] the authors show how changes in system parameters such as micro-service
failure and repair rates affect whole system performance metrics. However, sensitivity
evaluations differ from criticality evaluation by looking at how failure events impact
the non-functional behavior of a system.
Analysis of code importance and tendency to fail has also been used to aid designers in tracking vulnerabilities when introducing code edits [49–51]. These evaluations
can be used to direct developer attention to the most important code changes, however, they do not focus on the effects or propagation of hardware failures all the way
through the computation.
While criticality-focused work exists in the purely compute-oriented literature
(e.g. [52]), it has been the tradition of compute-oriented engineering to focus on faulttolerant compute paradigms. These paradigms aim to create perfect answers and
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throw out any results that do not conform [10]. This has been possible because of the
relatively low failure probabilities encountered when modern engineered systems are
kept at a small scales and run within strict parameters of both resource consumption
and guaranteed physical safety that may not be available in the future.

2.2

Fault Tolerance

Fault-tolerance techniques—the mainstay fallback of the computing world—rely on
the idea that if a fault occurs it should be corrected, and if that is not possible the
computation should be terminated. This paradigm, dedicated to the production of
strictly correct results, can be found operating at both the hardware and software
levels.
Examples of hardware oriented fault-tolerance techniques include [12–15]. In
[12,13], for example, a process known as simultaneous and redundantly threaded processing is used to check for transient hardware failures at the CPU level by running
at least two identical threads and checking thread reads and writes to parity protected memory against each other. The authors of [14] improve on this process by
scheduling threads such that certain latency concerns are minimized and execution
can be guaranteed across different CPU cores for each thread. The authors of [15],
alternatively, make use of out-of-order execution operations in super-scalar CPUs to
check for correct execution against transient hardware failures.
Software-oriented fault-tolerance techniques, however, can be found in [16–19].
[16] discusses SWIFT, a tool that compiles code to add redundant instructions that
take advantage of unused parallel compute resources to ensure successful control
flow in programs on failure-prone hardware. In [17] the authors present a number
of methods, implemented in software, to protect against data corruption in the face
of single event upsets—electronic disturbances caused by hardware encounters with
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radiation in space. A control flow analysis is used to create execution invariants that
can be easily checked against real world software operation in [19].
All together these works focus on the use of n-modular redundancy through
instruction replication and checking to guarantee deterministic execution. While
some of the works overlap this dissertation through the use of i.i.d. failure models
(e.g. [53, 54]), most works explore the effects of finite-bound failures, often one-off
failures.
A further extension to the software fault tolerance framework occurs in [55–57].
These works focus on improving fault tolerance by allowing software authors to
mark some code as more or less critical. Their methods are somewhat different from
previous software fault tolerance techniques, and more similar to the work of this
dissertation, since they focus on leveraging software developer’s knowledge of code
robustness and code criticality to redistribute compute resources towards protecting
the more vulnerable code regions. However, this dissertation extends these research
efforts by providing services that discover critical code operations through space and
time.
This dissertation further differs from these works in that criticality explores what
happens to computations when failures are not caught and corrected by fault-tolerant
techniques. This is important for multiple reasons. Today, large scale systems often
operate under the threat of silent data corruptions (SDC) [4]. The projected cost of
maintaining determinism in exascale-class HPC machines is becoming increasingly
prohibitive [20,58–62]. Further, authors are also pointing to a world where low energy
chips may allow for a tradeoff between energy use and computational reliability
[5, 25, 31, 63]
An important extension to the field of fault tolerance focuses on fault injection—the simulation of hardware and software failures that can then be used to test
program behavior under faulty conditions. This empirical field is interesting because
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it has produced techniques that can be used to study problems that lie both within,
and outside, the fault tolerance paradigm.

2.3

Fault Injection

Fault injection is an important technique in the study of computational robustness,
allowing experimenters to observe the behavior of systems subject to various kinds
of hardware failures and software faults. A significant problem for this subfield lies
in the difficulty of injecting hardware level failures into software systems. There has
been a tradition of prototype fault-injection studies performed at the hardware level
on built-for-purpose systems where both the software and hardware were created by
the same manufacturer [64]. Today, however, systems are often built on off-the-shelf
commodity hardware purchased from multiple producers. Under these circumstances
injecting faults at the hardware level for study throughout the whole stack is difficult.
One solution is virtual fault injection, which simulates the entire hardware stack with
an emulator as proposed by [65, 66].
Fault injection, as a field, also focuses on how individual system-component bugs
create faults in a broader computational system [67, 68]. An example of this is [69] a
study of software-injected software faults which shows that some fault injectors are
not as representative as they could be since regression tests are likely to catch the
kinds of failures they propose as possible bugs. Representativeness studies, however,
are not limited to software-level fault injectors on software-level faults. The authors
of [70] for example, examine the representativeness of virtually-injected hardware
faults using software-based simulators. Representativeness is an important subfield
of fault-tolerance research that is not directly addressed by this dissertation, but
which is addressed in future work.
Software-level bug-induced faults are also considered by [71]. The authors present
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a framework that measures the impact of bugs in one software service on an entire
system of software services. This is a common infrastructural paradigm for largescale public-facing Internet organizations where potential conflicts may be caused
when different versions of the same code base are running at the same time.
Altogether, these fault-injection techniques are used to extend fault-tolerance
to Internet platforms through the creation of fault-prediction mechanisms—systems
that use machine learning to predict the occurrence of faults before they happen.
However, these systems require a great deal of fault data that is often not available.
The authors of [72] propose a fault-injection technique that puts a simulated system in a faulty state which can then provide positive examples for fault prediction
systems.
My dissertation both complements and critiques these fault-injection studies.
For example, an interesting development in the fault-injection field has looked at the
plausibility of an attacker physically attacking a system to upset its most vulnerable
computational steps, with some degree of reliability such as [73–77]. My theoretical
work complements this empirical fault-injection work by showing the existence of
a sorting algorithm that is robust even in the face of worst-case malicious attacks
under a rate-limited error model of failure at all scales.
Effectively, my criticality analysis is a kind of fault-injection framework for studying program robustness to failures. However, it is focused on fault-injection at the
software level. Additionally, unlike most software-level injectors it is not focused on
software bugs or the simulation of realistic hardware failures. Instead it focuses on
analyzing the ways that an algorithm may naturally amplify or attenuate the impact
of failures that occur at the level of program-visible operations, no matter what their
actual path into program space. Further, since I do not perfectly simulate hardware
failures, I can instead implement failure modes that explore how coordinated errors,
below the object-function level, impact program performance in keeping with results
that show that low-level failure coordination can produce greater error rates than
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uncoordinated failures [78].
A final significant difference between my work and much of the fault-injection
field lies in the way that I measure system performance. Many authors measure
two kinds of values to evaluate fault-injected systems. The first include a series
of non-functional measures that are designed to capture the overhead of the faultinjection framework and any fault-tolerant code that is tested using the framework.
These overheads often come in the form of compute times, memory increases, and
changes in network usage. The second set of measures used by most authors is that
of expected system correctness, or the percentage of times that a fault is caught
before it can have any functional impact on the computation’s outputs.
My dissertation follows a different tradition that instead seeks to use quantified
correctness measures. These are able to capture the degree to which a fault-impacted
computation conforms to the correct output even when it deviates somewhat. That
is, I seek to quantify correctness.

2.4

Quantified Correctness

While the fault-tolerance framework abhors any uncaught failure, there are still works
within the framework that allow a failure to propagate all the way to program output with the goal of measuring the probability of strict correctness on computation
output. For example, in [79] the authors measure full-system sensitivity to simulated single-event upsets—random bit flips caused by high-energy particle collisions
within a computer. Alternatively, in [66] the authors find the probability that faults
injected into a high performance computing application will cause either no change
in the final output, an SDC, or cause a fatal crash. This tripartite evaluation lays the
beginnings of quantified correctness. However, other authors have moved further.
Performability is a technique for evaluating whole computational systems with
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many subcomponents which goes beyond even the tripartite no change/SDC/crash
notion of systemic correctness. Each component of the system is given a functional
strict correctness measure and/or a few non-functional measures to determine a score
for that component. The whole-system performance is then evaluated by combining
the scores of each of the subcomponents. Thus a system may degrade more or
less gracefully from perfect performance to completely non-functional. Examples of
performability metrics include job completion counts, link failures, output deviations,
or increases and decreases in throughput [80, 81]. However, performability still relies
on strict correctness measures to evaluate each subtask’s functional performance. It
could be extended so that subtasks have quantified error measures, however I have
yet to find such efforts in the literature.
There is some research that envisions failures altering the output of a function.
For example, the authors of [43] allow for program inputs that deviate from the
correct input, while disallowing failures in program operations at runtime. Their
method, called program continuity relies on showing that small changes in program
input produce small changes in program output using some error measure. Using
this method, they were able to show that bubble sort is continuous.
Alternatively, the selective reliability approach, discussed by [82], develops error
bounds on computations that are divided into higher and lower reliability sections.
Lower reliability sections are subjected to random hardware bit-flip faults that can
modify the output of the whole computation. The present work in some ways complements that approach, seeking to identify computational steps most in need of
high reliability. However, as previously stated, I focus on program-level failures, in
comparison operations while sorting, or in the addition and bit-checking operations
involved in multiplication, as opposed to hardware-level failures.
A paradigm of correctness sensitivity also complements works, such as [83] that
seek to use oracles to search for failures in traditional software-engineering settings
by further softening oracle requirements. Many evolutionary and machine-learning-
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oriented engineering paradigms, such as search-based software engineering [84], may
find that quantified correctness helps practitioners avoid search spaces with flagvariable problems—a situation where a software search space presents no signal of a
problematic operation outside of a few unconnected points in the space that causes
the triggering of a flag variable. With a quantified correctness measure, the spaces
around such events may be easier to spot.
Overall, quantified correctness opens up new unexplored territory for computer
scientists. If the goal isn’t perfect computation every time, but is instead to reach
for close results that degrade in some predictable manner as environmental conditions deteriorate, it becomes possible to find nice instances where computational
slack [85]–the resources wasted on ensuring correct computation—can be turned into
useful compute resources. It is also possible to create computations that can survive
harsh compute environments that do not provide enough resources for traditional
computing.

2.5

Approximate Algorithms and Computing

Approximate algorithms and computing are two closely related subfields that focus on obtaining useful results when it is not possible or feasible to obtain correct
outputs [30]. The two techniques however, provide approximation at different levels. In approximate algorithms, individual operations provide results according to
their definition, however the algorithm or individual operations are defined so that
they provide only close-to-correct outputs. Alternatively, approximate computing
employs algorithms and operations guaranteed to produce correct results if each
individual operation performs according to its definition, however they are run on
fallible hardware such that individual operations occasionally perform incorrectly.
Early approximate algorithms, such as in [41] focused on tasks that are still con-
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sidered unfeasible, such as the maximum independent set problem. Approximation
algorithms in this tradition focused on obtaining results that are near optimal, given
some limitations on the query set. However, while many of these algorithms made
use of randomized operations as in [86], the primary goal of authors lay in decreasing the use of compute resources in deterministic fault-tolerant environments. While
randomized operations could be used to provide the search field necessary for successful approximation, the randomized operations were often either pure mathematical
objects or the result of some psuedo-random deterministic process, with the randomness taken as part of the new approximate definition of the algorithm and its
operations. That is, authors did not focus on how approximation algorithms could
be improved through the use of actually-existing low-energy randomized switches at
the hardware level.
An advance in this direction is the sub-field of resilient algorithms. A subclass of
approximation algorithms that also lies within the field of approximate computing,
resilient algorithms focus on providing approximately correct results on failure-prone
hardware. For example, the authors of [87] transform deterministic algorithms, such
as sorting, min-cut/max-flow, shortest distance into a gradient descent problem on
a matrix with a different fitness function for each problem. Since gradient descent
works even when the gradient is approximate, it is possible for the gradient descent
problem to succeed even when running on a stochastically correct processor —a processor that is only guaranteed to return correct results some of the time.
While these methods rely on the mathematical stability of gradient descent algorithms in the face of occasional noise, they may not be suitable for all conceivable
computations. Further, they don’t provide an explanation for how computations
interact with failures induced by hardware. Instead, they lift the fault tolerance
framework to a new level, placing the whole computation in a space where failures
are unlikely to affect the outcome while hiding failure dynamics. Nor is it certain that
the gradient descent method will perform as efficiently as traditional algorithms, cre-
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ating a problem where increased per-operation efficiency on reliability-constrained
hardware is swamped by slow convergence time. For example, while the authors
of [87] show decreased power usage for least squares problems, they don’t show it for
sorting.

An approximate computing approach that is much closer to the criticality techniques presented in this dissertation is called Application Resilience Characterization (ARC) [5], based on dynamic binary instrumentation [88], ARC supports approximate computing by helping programmers understand how their applications
may function in failure-prone environments. This code analysis technique determines which code is sensitive or resilient and is complemented by hardware/software
schemes such as Flikker [32] that allow programmers to use partitioned code (called
critical or non-critical in the Flikker scheme) on hardware with varying energy usage and reliability characteristics. Overall, the authors of ARC show that many
algorithms can stand either a low rate of arbitrarily bad failures, or a high rate
of low impact failures. However, both Flikker and ARC have focused on algorithms
that are inherently robust, such as machine learning algorithms and video processing
computations. Perfect correctness is rarely expected in such environments.

These complement my work—which focuses on traditionally deterministic sorting
and multiplication algorithms—by providing a quick method for determining which
operations qualify for the constrained reliability allocation problem. However, these
methods analyze code-level operation failures, assigning each line to one of the tripartite no change/SDC/crash categorizations. In my work, I focus on time-bucketed
quantitative evaluation of the impact of failures on program output which provides
a richer understanding of how failures interact with computational outputs. This
understanding is useful because it can be leveraged to improve the performance of
computations running in reliability-constrained environments through the usage of
economies of error.
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Error Economization

Error economization is the process of establishing a common relationship between all
possible failures such that one failure can be avoided by increasing the resources spent
on that failure and decreasing the resources spent on some other failure. When some
knowledge of the final impact of a failure on computational error is also understood, it
becomes possible to leverage this economization in a manner that redirects resources
from trivial failures to more important ones.

Some of the works that I have already discussed implicitly contain a kind of
economization of failure. For example, in [38] the authors present a scheduling
algorithm for cyber-physical systems that allows high criticality operations to trump
low criticality operations when a system encounters a spike in work load. This can be
viewed through a quantified correctness lens as an increase in low criticality operation
failures and a decrease in high criticality operation failures. The authors of [39]
present a similar balancing of resources between critical and non-critical network
communications in a medical network and, in some sense, the entire field of network
quality of service (QoS) can be seen as a kind of economy of error where low criticality
communiques are stalled or dropped for the benefit of higher criticality ones.

Some of the work closest to mine on the error economization front can be found
in [33]. There, the authors present a concrete hardware platform for a camera in
which they provide quality-energy curves that show how energy usage in various
hardware components relates to total system output quality along a Pareto front
of best quality for the energy buck. However, the process of providing this curve
requires detailed hardware knowledge specific to the particular platform they were
working with. An advantage of this dissertation is the lack of such a requirement.
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Theories of Robustness

Looking beyond the empirical techniques and frameworks that have been used to analyze computational robustness, this dissertation also seeks to explore the theoretical
underpinnings of computational robustness research. Concretely, a large amount of
my work has focused on sorting algorithms. While I have presented some works that
focus on solving the sorting problem in the face of failures (e.g. [42,53]), there is considerable work under the fault-tolerance paradigm that explores the theory of robust
sorting networks and techniques when dealing with faulty comparators. In [89] the
authors present a sorting network such that there are only n comparator pairs which
produce a faulty output when both comparators fail. Interestingly, [87] develops robust floating point numerical problem solvers for several exact algorithms, including
sorting. They demonstrate correct sorting on small lists with even as many as half
the floating point operations failing.
Moving beyond theories of robustness in the fault-tolerance paradigm, I have
focused on two different scenarios for the distribution and modeling of failure—
correlated worst-case models that can be used to simulate malicious attacks and
uncorrelated i.i.d. failure models. In both scenarios I have used rate-limited models
where only some percentage of all computational operations may be corrupted.
The rate-limited worst-case model I use is very similar to the model found in
[44]. In this model an attacker is allowed to modify up to δ memory locations and
during their analysis they often transform this value into a number of corruptions per
unit time σ. To deal with these modifications, the authors provide resilient sorting
algorithms that can provide outputs that are provably ‘k-resilient’—that have at
most k items out of place. While this error model is very similar to that found in
Chapter 5 for worst-case algorithmic robustness, one weakness of their proof is that
the allowed proportion of total fallible memory locations shrinks as the size of the
algorithm grows. Specifically, their FAST sorting algorithm only allows δ = O((n
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log n)1/3 ) modified operations even though the run time is O(n log n + δ 3 ).
There is a long tradition of using i.i.d. models of computational failure. In [53] the
authors present a sorting network that can sort an input list with high probability as
long as each comparator has an i.i.d. failure probability less than 1/2. The authors
of [54] use an i.i.d. failure model on connections between nodes in a grid computing
environment. Further, works I have already discussed (e.g. [5]), also tend to default
towards i.i.d. models when no strong argument for some other model presents itself.
This is reasonable, considering that i.i.d. models exist to handle situations where
there is a lack of information concerning the correlations of various events as is often
the case with many physical processes.
However, there is a subtle difference between my model and most previous i.i.d.
failure models. When these models are rigorously applied at the level of hardware,
many failures are caught by statistical fault-tolerance techniques before they can
ever impact actual program outputs. Therefore, failures such as these tend to impact programs only if they are correlated. My work, however, injects failures into
applications by directly modifying program operations, skipping detailed hardware
simulations. This is effectively the same as asking what will happen given that failures are sufficiently correlated to impact program operations. In this way, my i.i.d.
failure model at the level of program operations is also a model of correlated failure
at the level of hardware.
Finally, my theoretical work on the lg(n) growth of operations in i.i.d. resistant
scalably robust algorithms complements empirical results from Fiala [90] showing
that scalable determinism requires ever more reliable hardware components. Avoiding this outcome requires a more sophisticated model of failure and error.
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Chapter 3
The Model
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3.3

Introduction

There are many potential relationships between failed operations, correct operations,
and the output of an algorithm. A failed operation at one point in an algorithm on
one particular input may have a very different relationship to the output of the
algorithm than an operation even a small distance away. A complete description of
failure dynamics may be too complex to model.
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Rather, this dissertation seeks a rough understanding of failure dynamics on a
limited set of relationships between operation failures and algorithm output. The
perspective used by this dissertation is that of a criticality assessment—a method
for measuring the amount of additional error in algorithm output created by a failure
on a single operation at a specific location in the algorithm, all other things being
equal.
Once this assessment is performed, in some studies I also pair the results with
an economy of error and a simulated method of resource redistribution to show that
criticality results can be used to improve algorithmic performance. These economies
of error restrict the algorithm to an insufficient amount of resources necessary for
correct execution. I show the usefulness of the criticality assessment method by evaluating the performance of the algorithms with, and without, economic rebalancing.
In this chapter I discuss criticality assessments in greater detail in Section 3.4. In
Section 3.5 I explore how quantified correctness is used in the form of error measures
to evaluate program performance throughout this dissertation. Next, in Section 3.6
I explore the use of space and time in the criticality assessment method and in Section 3.7 I present a formal, mathematical definition for criticality as used throughout
this work. Some of the studies in this dissertation were produced through the use of
a general-purpose tool, Criticality Explorer, that I wrote and which is explained in
Section 3.8. Finally, in Section 3.9, I explore the technical specifics of using criticality
assessment results to solve the constrained reliability allocation problem.

3.4

Criticality Assessments

In this dissertation I present a method of assessing operation failure criticality that is
based on measuring the outcome of Monte Carlo simulations of algorithms run with
faulty operations. These simulations require an input generator, an error measure,

Chapter 3. The Model

32

and some notion of an operation’s failure mode, or behavior when a failure occurs
during its execution.
An input generator produces random inputs to the algorithm following some
statistical rule or distribution. The input generator has two requirements:

1. It must provide well formed inputs for the program—namely, it must provide
lists for sorting, numbers for addition, graphs for max-flow/min-cut, etc.
2. Inputs produced by the input generator must be random.

Outside of these, there is no further requirement placed on the input generator in
principle by this dissertation.
Specific, concrete error measures used in this dissertation will be covered in more
detail in Chapters 4 and 5. For now it suffices to say than an error measure accepts
two outputs from some algorithm under examination and then provides an evaluation of the distance between these two outputs. In order to perform a criticality
assessment, one of the outputs is produced by a run of the algorithm in which some
failure has been simulated while the other output, generally called the “correct” output or “more correct” output, will be produced by a run of the algorithm without
that particular failure. The difference, as calculated by the error measure, is the
operational instance criticality.
An operation’s failure mode describes how the operation behaves during a failure.
This allows us to ask what would happen if a failure were to occur, unchecked, at
some given location or moment within the algorithm. Failure modes are meant
to abstract correlated errors which may occur in the hardware and software stacks
beneath an algorithm so that it becomes possible to ask how the algorithm itself
behaves when it encounters a particular computational failure without aid from the
hardware.
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An example failure mode could be written for numerical comparisons in which
the outcome of some comparison between two numbers returns the opposite of the
correct result of the comparison. Given an operation x < y which returns true if x
is less than y or false otherwise, an acceptable failure mode for the operation might
return x >= y. When executed on x = 3 and y = 4 in its failure mode this operation
3 < 4 would return false even though in its correct mode it would return true.

Another failure mode may return rand(T rue, F alse), a coin-flip result instead of
the correct result. In this failure mode the operation 3 < 4 would return True half
the time and False half the time. Either of these would be an acceptable failure
mode. All that is required is that the failure mode accept the same inputs as the
operation in question, plus a random number generator, and return an output of the
same type as the original operation without throwing an exception or warning the
algorithm in some other way.

So far, I’ve discussed the components used in a criticality analysis. In keeping
with the approximate design paradigm, faults in program operations are allowed
to percolate into program output. Once in the output they produce errors which
can then be measured to produce a failure criticality—by performing one run of the
algorithm with that particular failure and another run without a failure and then
taking the difference in the output error between the two runs.

This difference is evaluated through error measures. However, a major hypothesis
of this work is that error measures that evaluate whether a computation has been
performed correctly are insufficient to produce interesting failure dynamic results.
Instead we need quantified error measures that score algorithm outputs on a ‘curve’
and that give ‘partial credit’.
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Error Measures

For the sake of capturing each failure’s criticality, an error measure is necessary to
evaluate the output quality of the computation with and without the failure. The
error measure E(Oe , Oc ), takes outputs from an errorful run of the computation, Oe
and compares it to a correct or ‘less errorful’ run of the computation Oc . In this
work, I present both normalized and unnormalized error measures with normalized
error measures set to return values in [0..1] and unnormalized error measures set to
return unbounded positive error. A normalized error measure need not be completely
continuous in [0..1], however a good measure should attempt to hit as many values
in that range as possible.
For example, the L2 error from linear algebra would make a good a quantified
correctness measure. This measure is the sum of the squared distances between all
elements in a vector and some reference vector of the same size. However, it would
also be unnormalized. To normalize the error measure, one might pick a large L2
error cutoff, and send all L2 errors above that value to 1 while dividing all other
output errors by the cutoff value.
In Chapters 4 and 5 I will present specific error measures for sorting, scalar
multiplication, and matrix multiplication.
Using these error measures, for small computations it may be possible to calculate
every specific failure’s criticality exactly, with each failure being identified as a single
flaw in the total state of the program throughout its entire run. But many algorithms
have a state space that is combinatoric and so algorithms of even moderate size
cannot be assessed in a reasonable time frame.
Instead, this study uses Monte Carlo sampling to estimate the error measure
values with and without the failure. Rather than consider each failure from each
different input separately, failures are bucketed together by their characteristics and
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an average increase in error is calculated for each bucket. A novel advance of this
dissertation is the use of the failure’s location in the algorithm to calculate these
averages.

3.6

Mathematical Abstractions of
Space and Time

Locating a failure within a computational system is a trickier prospect than it might
first appear. It is important to remember that computations, for all their virtuality,
are first physical processes than involve the movements of energy and matter through
real objects, no matter how small those movements may be. Further, programs
impose a certain logic on the geometry of the hardware they sit upon. This event
cannot occur before that event, this data must be close to that data and they must
combine with each other within a certain number of seconds.
However, a too-strong insistence on examining computations at the level of electrons and transistors can also leave us without a full understanding of the virtual
spaces that exist within a computation at higher levels. Further, for some analyses,
however incomplete they may be, it becomes unimportant whether the computation
is occurring on a head moving up and down a piece of tape, or in a central processor,
or across a series of cores distributed throughout a large system. And, therefore,
many algorithmic analyses use very abstract notions of space and time. In these
analyses all points in space touch each other and time is a single universal clock.
This work proposes an analysis of space and time that lies between the physical
and the abstract. For the purposes of this work, each operation failure occurs at
some failure point, K = (Op, i). This failure point is is defined by an operation, Op,
and an execution index, i, that counts the number of times the operation has so far
been executed in the computation. The operation Op, is any function in the code
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that accepts program state, mutates it, and returns a new program state. Operations
can be simple, like addition, or complicated, like a call to a sorting function. An
example operation failure may be located at K = (43 : (int) + (int), 3). Here, K is
equal to the third time the operation 43 : (int) + (int) - a sum of two ints on line 43
- is executed in the program. Notice, that in a serial deterministic algorithm with a
single failure mode, failure points are unique to each failure.
For a failure point, the operation is an abstraction of space while the execution
index is an abstraction of time. A particular operation in the code often occurs in
the same physical location in a computational system. Further, program states that
have very similar impacts on program output often move together, through a given
operation, within a very small window of possible execution indices.
Operations must also be packaged with a failure mode, as described, that perform
an incorrect mutation of program state, from the perspective of the program. Operations in this work are allowed to have only a single failure mode, however future
analyses may employ more. This binary modality does allow for a simple failure
mode notation, however. In this work, K ∗ notes that the operation at K employed
its failure mode while K means it ran its correct mode.
An additional requirement of this work is that failure modes not mutate large
segments of program state. Instead, they only affect the return value of an operation
or the program state that the operation mutates in the last few moments of its
execution. This helps strengthen the notion of an operation as an abstraction of
space as the operation’s failure is unable to affect all program state unless it first
affects the behavior of other operations.
Using this spatio-temporal paradigm we can then develop more completely the
idea of a failure’s criticality when it is bucketed by location. Rather than consider
the additional error due to all failures, or due to each failure individually, we can
begin to ask questions about the additional error due to a failure at a particular
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failure point.

3.7

Criticality Defined

A rough definition of criticality, as the extra error due to a single failure, has already been given. However determining the extra error due to every failure under
each distinct circumstance is infeasible for large programs and does not produce a
parsimonious description of failure criticality. Instead, I have presented a spatiotemporal representation that ties each failure to a particular unique location in a
computational process. It is now possible, using this representation, to provide a
more precise definition of criticality as it is used in this work while also accounting
for the interaction between a failure and background failures that might additionally
occur during the execution of a program.
However, failures can have strange behavior. Sometimes, a failure may only
impact the output of a program given that other failures have also occurred [45]. It
is possible that a certain amount of background noise is necessary before a failure
impacts the output, as occurs under n-modular redundancy. In my definition of
failure criticality I use the representation outlined in the previous section to design
reproducible experiments measuring the additional error due to a single failure under
many different conditions—both those with, and without, background failures.
Reproducible criticality experiments are performed through the use of a failure
pattern—a record of when and where in the computation each failure occurs. Given
a program description of length M and an expected max run time of T , each of the
M T failure points is marked with the star-notation used above to produce a failure
pattern. So, for example, a program with three occurrences of a single operation K
might have a failure pattern: (K, 0), (K ∗ , 1), (K, 2) that shows a failure on only the
second instance of operation K.
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We also use the star notation to mark the difference between a failure pattern with
a particular failure and a failure pattern without a particular failure. If f is a failure
pattern, I use the notation f ∧ K ∗ to mean the failure pattern with failure point K
in its failure mode and f ∧ K to mean failure pattern f with K in its correct mode.
Finally, to ensure the reproducibility of this operation, if the computation overruns
its expected run time T it is marked as returning some maximum or unbound error,
or the result is thrown out and recorded as a program time overrun, depending on
the error score.
Since each failure point’s criticality is meant to account for many possible failures
occurring in the presence of many possible distributions of background failures, it
is not enough to speak of a single failure pattern at a time. Instead, I use F to
represent a failure pattern distribution or probability distribution over the set of all
possible failure patterns of size M T .
There are many different potential ways to select the failure pattern distribution
F . In general, I will consider two failure pattern distributions. The first is F 0 —a
distribution where all failure points operate in the correct mode. The second is F  —
a distribution in which failure pattern probabilities are equal to their probability in
an i.i.d. failure model with a failure rate of . Since failure patterns are drawn from
these distributions I use f ∼ F to note that a failure pattern f has been drawn from
the distribution F and that it is weighted by its probability of occurrence in F .
Since I am dealing with computations run under many different failure patterns,
I adopt the convention Cf to mean computation C running with failure pattern f .
Thus Cf is a simulation of computation C when specific operational instances, as
defined by f , have been forced to fail. Cf (i) is the result produced when computation
C is run on input i over fault pattern f .
Using this failure pattern and the locality notation it is now possible to write a
reproducible and parsimonious notion of failure criticality as the additional error due
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to a single failure, as presented in Equation 3.1.

CritC,F,I,E (K) = avg∀i∈I,f ∼F E(Cf ∧K ∗ (i), Cf ∧K (i))

(3.1)

This definition integrates all of the components so far discussed into a single
notion of criticality that is oriented towards an understanding of failures as being in
relation to
1. the programs in which they occur, captured by C,
2. input distributions captured by I,
3. failure pattern distributions captured by F , and
4. error measurements captured by E.
This understanding emphasizes the spatial and temporal nature of failures by
placing criticality measurements in a field of failure points that are abstracted from
physical space and time. However, that same abstraction also allows the concept to
focus on the failure properties of specific high level algorithms when failures impact
those algorithm’s performance by escaping into the algorithm’s compute space—as
can occur when failures are coordinated or computation economies are too tight for
strictly correct execution.
In the next section I present Criticality Explorer —a Java- and AspectJ-based
[91, 92] tool I developed to perform criticality assessments on tooled algorithms.
It can be found at https://github.com/ThomasBJones2/CriticalityExplorer.
Criticality Explorer also performs an economic assessment of algorithm performance
when criticality assessments are used to direct robustification resources towards the
most important computational steps. I will also note some distinctions that lie
between the theory of criticality outlined above and its practical implementation as
embodied in Criticality Explorer.
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Criticality Explorer

To measure failure point criticalities, Criticality Explorer requires an input generator,
an error measure, and a set of failure interfaces for each algorithm assessed. Inputs
are drawn from the input generator and outputs are assessed with the error measure
while the failure interfaces take on the role of the failure modes from the previous
section. See Figure 3.1 (page 46) for a visual overview of the experimental process
used by Criticality Explorer.
In Criticality Explorer the input generator is handled by an input object which
conforms to an input object Java interface. Input objects must have a randomize
method that acts as the input generator to an experiment object. These experiment
objects run the experiment program and provide a score method that evaluates the
error measure difference between an errorful and a less errorful—sometimes called
‘correct’—experiment object.
In Criticality Explorer, failure interfaces operate at the level of Java methods
chosen by the user. In addition to the correct method code, the user provides an
alternate failure method. This method has the same signature as the original Java
method, except that it accepts an added parameter, a random number generator,
to be used to simulate underlying failures in the stack beneath the method. Failure
interfaces in the experiment object are annotated with ‘@Randomize’ and require
two implementations—the correct implementation, and a failure implementation—
to function.
The failure interfaces identify a spatiotemporal set of failure points bucketed
at some space-time granularity. These buckets are locations uniquely defined by
their associated failure interface and an invocation count on that failure interface.
Criticality Explorer assess the criticality of a failure point by estimating the expected
degree of damage that failure point would cause, assuming all else is equal. Given a
set of failure interfaces, I call the criticality distribution produced by the assessment
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process a failure shape.
Failure interfaces could be defined at higher, lower, or just other levels of abstraction but I see five principal advantages to method-level failure interfaces:
1. In a direct hardware realization, the data paths of multiple instances of an object method often pass through similar or even the exact same circuits. Methodlevel failures may thus provide increased abstraction while still approximating
important spatial failures of real hardware.
2. Method-level failure interfaces are flexible. Beyond the SDCs and energy economization failures that inspire this dissertation, they can also represent software
bugs or failures in distributed computations. Criticality Explorer can be used
to analyze a wide range of hardware and software failures.
3. Many robustness engineering methods are designed to compensate for independent, identically distributed failures. I too consider i.i.d. failures, but methodlevel interfaces can also model higher-order coordinated failures arising from
deep within the computational stack. Specifically, failure interfaces written on
major, central methods, can simulate SDC errors that have percolated through
the stack to become visible to the user.
4. Since most modern languages treat methods as (nearly) first class objects, it is
easy for software engineers to understand and implement failure interfaces at
the method level.
5. Method-level interfaces conform to the intuition that SDCs occur when objects
uphold their interfaces but violate their contracts.
Criticality Explorer records the number of invocations on each method-level failure interface to generate the failure point field. A small number of exploratory runs
at tested input sizes and  failure rate are performed in order to find each failure
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interfaces maximum invocation count. Using this information Criticality Explorer
then evaluates each failure point criticality through Monte Carlo simulation. A random input is drawn using randomize and an experiment, failed only at the given
failure point, is compared with a failure-free run of the algorithm on the same input.
The error in their outputs is evaluated using the score method.
Criticality Explorer can take advantage of AWS lambda to perform many criticality assessments at once. This makes it possible to quickly assess failure point
criticalities at multiple input scales.
Because failed operations can cause unexpected behavior, Criticality Explorer
automatically catches and records any exceptions produced by experiment code at
run time. It also automatically terminates experiments after a hard-coded twominute time limit and records the termination as a runtime error. This is similar
to, but not exactly the same as, the maximum operation count from the previous
section.
Another difference lies in the way that failure patterns are implemented in Criticality Explorer. Rather than using failure patterns, as described in Section 3.7, Criticality Explorer instead uses a random number generator with a fixed random seed
to choose which operations’ failure methods are triggered and the random numbers
used to generate simulated failures inside a failure method at runtime. Given that
algorithms are otherwise deterministic, this guarantees the same program behavior
given the same input, and error measure.
When measuring failure point criticality, the algorithm must be run with the
operation forced to fail and forced to succeed as discussed in the previous section.
When the failed operation is forced to fail, however, it is possible that random
numbers from the generator will be consumed, which means that the failures after
the forced operation are not guaranteed to be the same in Criticality Explorer. This
is the single major difference between Criticality Explorer and the original criticality
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model [2], however there is a justification for this difference. Every failure tends to
change the meaning of the operations that occur after it. It is important that the
operations before a failure have the same behavior when measuring criticality, but
there is no significant reason to believe that the computational paths after the failed
operation need to be exactly the same for a successful measurement.
After criticality assessment, Criticality Explorer then performs three additional
experiments, discussed in the next section. The first measures experiment code
output error with an i.i.d. failure model with failure rate, , in [0, 0.1]. The experiment
code is then failure shaped —reliability resources are redistributed from trivial to
critical operations—according to the criticality assessment results. Finally, a proxy
economization experiment that uses some failure points’ criticalities as stand-ins
for others is also available within Criticality Explorer. As I will show, this proxy
method has the benefit of shrinking the criticality search space, providing improved
performance at a lower cost.

3.9

Failure Shaping

Failure shaping is designed to deal with reliability budgets that are insufficient for
strictly correct execution. This technique employs an economy of failure for each
fallible method in a computation. It also makes use of a failure rate  ∈ [0, 1] such
that roughly  of the failure points generated at runtime will fail. This is novel from
a fault-tolerant/intolerant perspective since a budget sufficient to provide correct
results is often presumed.
As a baseline Criticality Explorer ’s economy of failure presumes a non-zero i.i.d.
failure model at each failure point. Then, Criticality Explorer shapes the failures: the
least critical failure points—those with a criticality below the median criticality—
are adjusted to 2. Alternatively, the most important coordinates are given a failure
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rate of 0. This keeps the total failure rate over the whole computation at . This
failure redistribution scheme fits into a concept like triage where operations can either
be lost (less than median criticality) or salvageable (greater than median criticality).
The operations assumed to be failure-free form the ‘no treatment necessary’ category
traditionally found in triage processes.
This stylized and simplified economy of failure is oblivious to whatever actual
underlying mechanisms are used to shape failures within the system. I explore the
effects of failure shaping without proposing a complete, concrete, failure shaping
technology. However, relationships between power or energy and failure rate presented in [63, 85], for example, give me hope that economizations like this may be
realizable in a few years.
However, the current method of assessing operation criticality, even with averagecase location bucketing and optimizations using AWS lambda, is still very slow and
does not scale well. One method to get around these problems is the use of proxy
criticalities to shape operation failures. Under a normal economization each failure
point receives resources determined by its criticality performance. If it has high
criticality it receives a great deal of resources, otherwise it receives far fewer resources.
When making use of a proxy criticality, however, each failure point’s resource budget
is not determined by its criticality. Instead, the criticality of some proxy operation
is instead used to determine which operations should receive robustness resources.
An example of this proxy criticality method might crop up in a program that is
subject to bitwise failures during an addition operation. A single addition operation
on two numbers of size N could have, depending on the summation implementation,
3N such operations. While we may measure the criticality for every single bitwise
failure point in an algorithm, the proxy criticality path instead calls for the creation
of a failure interface for the addition operation as a whole. Then we might assign
resources to the bitwise operations internal to the summation operation, based off
the criticality performance of the total summation failure point they are a part of.
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Using these methods—criticality assessments, average case error rates, failure
shaping, and proxy criticalities—it is possible to uncover a new understanding of
the failure dynamics of deterministic algorithms. In the next chapter I describe how
these methods can be used to explore the failure dynamics of sorting algorithms in
particular.

details. Figure reprinted from [1] with permission.

the median criticality and error scores are produced for average i.i.d. as well as shaped failures. See Section 3.8 for

outputs, and absolute difference score can be found in the bottom center of the figure. Failures are then shaped using

without, a failure injected on the a given failure point and scores the error between the two runs. The errorful inputs,

failure point criticalities through a Monte Carlo simulation. Each sample produces the output of a single run with, and

calibration step to evaluate the maximum failure point count, and samples per failure point, the tool then estimates

rithm with error measures, input generator, and annotated method level failure interfaces shown on the left. After a

Figure 3.1: Criticality Assessment and Failure Shaping Overview. Criticality Explorer takes a prepared algo-
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Sorting Algorithm Criticality
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4.3

Introduction

The first study I present concerns the criticality of comparison operations in
comparison-based sorting algorithms. In this study:

• I observe the criticality behavior of three comparison-based sorting algorithms:
quicksort [93], merge sort [34], and bubble sort. A note: While many traditional
bubble sort algorithms encounter half the list on the average pass (e.g. [94]), my
algorithm encounters the full list on every pass and so I call it full bubble sort.
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Because this sorting algorithm performs more comparisons, it has a robustness
advantage compared to the usual bubble sort algorithm.
• The program input is a random permutation of the numbers 0..51, modeling a
shuffled deck of cards.
• I use normalized presortedness measures as my error measures. The normalization ensures that each measure maps any permutation of the input data into
a scalar value from 0.0 meaning “perfectly sorted” to 1.0 meaning “maximally
unsorted.”
• I consider only failures in the pair-wise sorting comparisons. Such failures fit
naturally into my adopted presortedness measures, but they are only one of
many possibilities. In particular, I presume the data items are never corrupted.
Discussion of the presortedness-based error measures used in this study can be
found in Section 4.3.1.
• The failure mode of the comparisons is equal to the opposite of the result they
would normally return: 3 < 4 returns T rue so a failed 3 < 4 will return F alse.
Alternatively, a randomized result could also work, however, its impact would
likely lead to a measurement of criticalities with half the value as those seen
in this study.
• As with all other studies in this thesis, whenever I draw from a failure pattern
distribution other than F 0 —the distribution will be drawn from an i.i.d. error
model at a rate of .

The results in this chapter predate the development of Criticality Explorer, and
each algorithm under consideration was manually tooled to accept both an input list
and a precomputed failure pattern. The program then checked the failure pattern to
set comparison operation modes. However, the basic underlying method of criticality
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measurement used in this study is very similar to the more developed method used
by Criticality Explorer.

4.3.1

Measuring Sortedness

To investigate sorting as an example, we must confront the question of what “‘sort
of’ sorted” might mean. Fortunately, sorting is an extremely well-studied topic, and
researchers have defined a variety of presortedness measures— [34] is one survey—
that quantify the notion of ‘partially correct sorting’. As their name would suggest,
these measures have traditionally been used to measure a list’s ‘presortedness’—its
degree of disorder before sorting—but they are also useful as output quality measures
on a fallible sorting algorithm.
Existing presortedness measures include inversions error —the number of items
immediately preceding a smaller item, and max displacement—the maximum distance any item must be moved to reach its correct position. In this paper, we explore
those measures, as well as all-or-none strict correctness, and a measure called Spearman’s footrule error which I have also called positional error. Strict correctness,
is 0 if the output is sorted and 1 otherwise. Definitions for the other three error measures—normalized inversions error [34], normalized max displacement [34],
and normalized Spearman’s footrule error [95]—appear below in Equations 4.1, 4.2,
and 4.3, respectively.
In those equations L(i) is the position of item i in the output list L, while L[i]
is the inverse operation: The value of the ith item in list L. Lc is the output of a
correctly sorted list. Since we sort lists of distinct numbers from 0 to N − 1 the ith
item in a sorted list is equal to Lc (i). Note that each error measure is normalized to
[0, 1] by dividing by the maximum possible value of that error measure.
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+1

2N − 2
−1
maxN
i=0 |Lc (i) − L(i)|
N −1

(4.1)

(4.2)

PN −1
SFE(L) =

i=0

|Lc (i) − L(i)|
SFE(N )

(4.3)

The normalization factor SFE(N )—the maximum Spearman’s footrule error for
an input list of size N —is equal to the Spearman’s footrule error when a list is reverse
sorted:
SFE(N ) =

N
−1
X

|N − (2Lc (i)) − 1|

i=0

j N 2 k
=2
2

4.4

(4.4)

Results

The criticality for a failure at each comparison index was obtained by taking a sample
of 1000 failure pattern-input pairs for each comparison in the algorithm. Inputs were
randomly generated so that each list item had a uniform probability of occurring in
any location in the list. Failure-patterns were sampled from a binomial distribution
set to produce true bits at rates of 0%, 10%, and 20% so that comparisons not under
consideration would fail at a consistent i.i.d. background failure rate 1 .
To test the first half of Hypothesis 1.4.1 on sorting algorithms, I first measured
each of the algorithms using strict correctness error. The results from this test can be
1 Note

that as we use it here a background failure rate of 0% means there are no failures
other than the one failure being induced in the comparison under consideration.
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found in Figure 4.1 (page 54). In this figure, the criticality of comparison operations
at a 0% background failure rate is 1 nearly everywhere for the two algorithms that run
in O(n lg n) time. A failure on any operation leads to a judgment of complete failure
for the program. Alternatively, at higher background failure rates no operation seems
to have any criticality—all the damage has already been done. O(n2 ) bubble sort,
however, is anomalous. Most operations have no immediate impact on output and
instead only the last n operations seem to have an impact at 0% background failure
rate. Otherwise, at higher failure rates the pattern that shows no criticality holds.
There is an additional anomalous pattern towards the end of each algorithm where
the final few operations did present with a criticality between 0 and 1. However this
measurement reflects the probability of the algorithm reaching these final operations
at all rather than some diminished impact they might individually have on output
given that they have been reached.
In Figure 4.2 (page 55) I present the criticality results on merge sort for both
Spearman’s footrule error and max displacement error. The top graph shows the
Spearman’s footrule error (also known as positional error) with and without a failure
on the given operation at a 10% background failure rate. The middle graph shows
the difference between these two lines at the 10% background failure rate, as well as
the criticalities obtained at a 0% and 20% background failure rates. The final graph
shows max displacement error.
In the two bottom graphs we see a structure that cannot be found for strict
correctness error and which involves, roughly, four spikes in criticality at 0, 40,
100, and 140 comparisons. We also see, towards the end of the program, a tail of
about 50 operations (from about 180 to about 230) that all have low, but still nonzero, criticalities. We also see that max displacement error behaves very similarly
to Spearman’s footrule error at a 0% background failure rate, but is very muted
when the background failure rate goes above 0%. These structures are discussed in
Section 7.2.2.
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In Figure 4.3 (page 56) I present the results for max inversions and Spearman’s
footrule error measures on quicksort. Max inversions at a 0% error rate presents a
constant criticality across all comparison of ≈ 0.02. This is equivalent to a single
item being a single spot out of place. Whenever there are background failures this
criticality measure falls to a much lower level, however later operations have higher
criticalities than earlier operations. Note that Spearman’s footrule error obtains a
large spike before the first n comparisons, followed by an otherwise high value for
the first n comparisons and what appears to be a secondary spike before the next
n comparisons followed by criticalities that trail off towards zero at the end of the
algorithm.
Finally, in Figure 4.4 (page 57) I present the criticality results for full bubble sort
on Spearman’s footrule error. In this algorithm, no criticality is measured on any
comparison except the last n comparisons, at 0% background failure rate. However,
as the background failure rate is turned up, we see a periodic pattern of increased
criticalities on the middle operations of every pass through the algorithm.
In this chapter, I only conveyed my immediate impressions concerning the experimental results on sorting. In Chapter 7 I will explore the consequences of these
data in greater detail and speculate on their meaning.
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Strict Correctness Criticality For Merge Sort,
Quick Sort and Bubble Sort
1
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Figure 4.1: Strict Correctness Criticality on Sorting Algorithms Extremal
values dominate in a plot of strict correctness criticality (y axis) vs. the comparisons
executed during a sort (‘Comparison Index’; x axis): Most faults are either critical
or not critical. See Section 4.4 for details. Figure reprinted from [2] with permission.
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ACPE and Criticality By Comparison
Index In Merge Sort
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Figure 4.2: Quantified Correctness on Merge Sort The average conditional
positional error curves (top graph), corresponding to the estimated error with and
without the fault at the given comparison index, and the positional error criticality
(middle graph), both based on a 10% background error rate. Note that the purple
and blue boxes are error bars. See text for details. Figure reprinted from [2] with
permission.
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Positional Error Criticality and Inversions Criticality
Vs. Comparison Index For Quick Sort
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Figure 4.3: Quantified Correctness Results on Quicksort In quicksort we see
that the choice of error measure can effect which comparisons are seen as most
critical. With a positional error measure the first N comparisons are the most critical.
However, under the inversions error measure the first N comparisons are the least
critical comparisons. See text for details. Figure reprinted from [2] with permission.
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Positional Error Criticality

Positional Error Criticality Vs. Comparison Index
in Bubble Sort
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Figure 4.4: Periodic Criticality in Bubble Sort When facing a non-zero background error rate bubble sort presents periodic criticality behavior. The bottom
graph is a subgraph of the top graph. See text for details. Reprinted from [2] with
permission.
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5.3

Introduction

The second study I present concerns the criticality of add, boolean check, and scalar
multiply operations in multiplication algorithms. In this study:

Chapter 5. Criticality and Armoring in Matrix Multiplication

60

• I examine the criticality behavior of two scalar multiplication algorithms and
two matrix multiplication algorithms.
• The program input for the scalar multiplication algorithms are integers represented as bit strings generated by flipping bits using a binomial distribution.
For the matrix multiplication algorithms the inputs are are square matrices of
integers of 10 bits with dimensions of size 2l for some l.
• For the scalar multiplication algorithms I use absolute difference, log absolute
difference, and absolute percentage difference error measures.
• I consider only failures on add, check, and scalar multiplication operations
executed by each program.
• The failure mode of the add and scalar multiply operations randomly flip one
bit in their outputs. The failure mode of a boolean check returns the opposite
result as the ‘correct’ result of the boolean check operation.

5.4

Failure Shaping on Scalar Multiplication

I used Criticality Explorer to measure failure point criticalities in the O(N 2 ) naive
scalar multiplication and O(N lg2 3 ) Karatsuba multiplication algorithms [96]. I note
that while Karatsuba, outlined in Algorithm 1 has a faster asymptotic runtime than
naive multiplication, its runtime is actually longer on the input sizes I tested.
I employed the same input generator for both algorithms, producing random N
bit vectors interpreted as two’s-complement integers. I applied three different error
measures to each algorithm: absolute value, absolute logarithmic value, and absolute
percent value. Given the correct answer C and an incorrect output I, absolute value
returned |C − I|, absolute logarithm value returned ln(|C − I| + 1), and absolute
percent value returned

|C−I|
.
|C|+1
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Algorithm 1: Karatsuba Multiplication
1: procedure Karatsuba(x, y)
2:
3:

if bl(x) ≤ 8 then
return Naive(x,y)

4:

end if

5:

if x ≡ 0 or y ≡ 0 then

6:

. bl(x) is bit length of x

return 0

7:

end if

8:

x1 2m + x0 = x

9:

y1 2m + y0 = y

10:

z1 = Karatsuba(x1 , y1 )

11:

z2 = Karatsuba(x0 , y0 )

12:

z3 = Karatsuba(x1 + x0 , y1 + y0 )

13:

k = z3 − z2 − z1

14:

return 22m z1 + 2m k + z3

.m≤

min(bl(x),bl(y))
2

15: end procedure

I defined failure interfaces for check and add methods used by both algorithms.
The Boolean check method returns true if the given bit of a number is 1 and f alse if
the number is 0. Its failure method returns the opposite result when a failure occurs.
The add method returns the sum of two numbers and its failure method randomly
flips one bit on the output when called. Since Karatsuba called naive multiply at
small input sizes, both algorithms would call a common addition operation while
Karatsuba called a special Karatsuba add, located only in the Karatsuba recursion
function, separately.
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Criticality Assessment Results on Scalar Multiplication

Figure 5.1 (page 68) presents example criticality distributions and sample sizes for
both naive multiplication and Karatsuba multiplication algorithms. I obtained similar results with 100, 200, and 500 bit numbers; here I focus on N = 100 and N = 500.
Naive multiplication’s check interface follows a log-linear growth pattern at all input sizes. Karatsuba’s check and add interfaces display repeating three maxima
criticality patterns at both scales, in keeping with its triple recursive call.
Both distributions maintain tight bounds on the log-linear scale for all but the
final few failure points. As sample size decreases, standard error increases. I chose
not to display absolute value and absolute percent value because both graphs appear
flat on all but one or two failure points. For scalar multiplication, error is grows exponentially. Figure 5.1 (page 68) also illustrates the median criticality for each failure
interface. For the add interfaces, naive multiply’s medians lie below Karatsuba’s.
With check the inverse is true.

5.4.2

Failure Shaping Results on Scalar Multiplication

In Figures 5.8 (page 75), 5.9 (page 76), and 5.10 (page 77) I show failure shaped
error results against i.i.d. failure model outcomes for each failure interface and error
measure at input size 100. My sample size was 1000 on both algorithms and all three
error measures. Tested error rates, , were evenly distributed in [0, 0.1].
Failure shaping, as I have outlined it, can distort the underlying failure rate, .
I believe this is caused by inaccuracies in the measured median failure rate, or by
changes in the run time caused when  increases from zero. Therefore, I report results
at the actual observed rate of failure, 0 , in my graphs. Nonetheless, 0 is generally
within 5% of .
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Failure shaping cuts the average absolute logarithmic failure by about 30. It cuts
the absolute value and absolute percent value by between 10% and 90%. Further,
the Karatsuba algorithm benefits more from failure shaping than naive multiply.

5.5

Failure Shaping Matrix Multiplication

To show how leverage works on multiple algorithmic scales—across hierarchies of operations within algorithms—I used Criticality Explorer to perform an economization
procedure on two matrix multiplication algorithms. The first is the O(N 3 ) naive
matrix multiplication algorithm. The second algorithm is Strassen’s algorithm [97].
This algorithm runs in O(N 2.8 ) and is the first divide and conquer matrix multiplication algorithm found to run faster than O(N 3 ). It is outlined in Algorithm 2 (page
78) .
The input generators used for both algorithms were randomly generated matrices
of size N × N with 10 bit integers for each element.
I employed three error measures: the Frobenius norm (FN, also known as the
matrix euclidean distance), the infinity norm (IN), and the logarithmic Frobenius
norm (LFN) given in Equations 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 respectively. In these equations,
Mc and Mi are the correct and incorrect matrices and ei and ec are the correct and
incorrect matrix elements at the same position in either matrix.

F N (Mi , Mc ) =

q

Σ∀ec ,ei ∈Mc ,Mi (ec − ei )2

IN (Mi , Mc ) = argmax∀ec ,ei ∈Mc ,Mi |ec − ei |

(5.1)

(5.2)
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(5.3)

I reused the scalar multiplication failure interfaces check and add. Both naive and
Strassen’s matrix multiply used the naive scalar multiplication sub-algorithm
to perform element-wise multiplication.

5.5.1

Criticality Assessment Results on Matrix Multiplication

Figure 5.11 (page 79) presents example criticalities for both algorithms on selected
operations and scales. I note here that the first major structure I observe in the failure
shapes of the two matrix multiplication algorithms lies in the differences between
them. Naive matrix multiplication has, in general, a lower criticality. Its criticalities
are also flatter than those found in the highly structured Strassen’s algorithm. At
every test scale we see spikes in both add and check operations about 2/7, 3/7
and 5/7 through the algorithm run on both the infinity and Frobenius norm error
measures for Strassen’s algorithm.
This structure can also be seen on the log Frobenius norm error measure. However, it becomes harder to disentangle at larger scales as the data is squeezed. To
see criticality structures on this error measure at large scales, we focus on a smaller
set of failure points. Figure 5.21 (page 89) shows a view of the log Frobenius norm
criticalities from failure point 13000 to 18000 on input size 16. The structure we see
is analogous to those seen from failure points 275 to 350 at input scale 4, and from
2000 to 2500 at input scale 8.
As with scalar multiplication, criticality standard error increases with decreasing
sample size at the end of both algorithm’s failure shape.
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In naive multiply, criticalities lie close to both the average and the median criticality. By contrast, in Strassen’s algorithm important operations are outliers with
criticalities often an order of magnitude greater than the median.

5.5.2

Failure Shaping Results on Matrix Multiplication

Figures 5.25 (page 93), 5.26 (page 94), and 5.27 (page 95) show the direct failure
shaping results on naive and Strassen’s matrix multiply algorithms plotted against
an i.i.d. failure model. 1000 samples were taken at each percentile in [0, 0.1]. We can
see that direct failure shaping produces roughly 40% error reductions compared to a
baseline i.i.d. error model.
Monte Carlo sampling is a powerful statistics-gathering method, but its simulation costs here grow with the number of failure points in the system under test.
Criticality Explorer can be connected to the AWS Lambda on-demand compute
service [98], allowing investigators to trade money for time by performing parallel
assessments in the cloud. As an example, the data presented in this paper was produced for under $320 in cloud costs—with the majority of that consumed by the
scale 16 criticality assessments.
Even assuming such a large-scale infrastructure, though, brute force Monte Carlo
costs will become prohibitive as the software stack under test grows deeper, placing
more computational levels between the hardware and the end-user error measures.
In the next section I introduce ‘proxy criticalities’—an approach to evaluate such
multilevel software that not only slashed assessment costs, but also, I found, even
improved performance.
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Proxy Failure Shaping

I took advantage of method level failure interface flexibility to speed up the failure
shaping procedure by using proxy criticalities. Rather than measuring each failure
point’s criticality, I instead measured the criticality of a proxy method —a method
that stands in for those methods originally intended to fail.
In this section experiments continued to make use of fallible check and add
operations. However, each add and check failure interface was only called as part
of a scalar multiplication method. I wrote a failure interface that randomly
flipped one bit in a scalar multiplication invocation’s output. Thus, criticality
assessment costs on matrices with element size e require ∼1/e resources using scalar
multiplication as a proxy for check and add. For example, the size 32 proxy
algorithm assessment cost less than $14 on AWS lambda.
Using this failure interface I measured each multiplication failure point’s criticality. Figures 5.22 (page 90), 5.23 (page 91), and 5.24 (page 92) show criticality
assessment results on scalar multiply operations employed by both matrix multiplication algorithms. These criticalities and their median value were then employed to
make decisions about the reliability budgeting of every check and add failure point
that occurred during each multiplication operation’s execution.

5.6.1

Criticality and Failure Shaping Results on Scalar Multiplication Proxy Method

Figures 5.22 (page 90), 5.23 (page 91), and 5.24 (page 92) present example proxy
operation criticality distributions for both naive and Strassen’s matrix multiply at
input sizes 4, 8, and 16 respectively. Assessing criticality on scalar multiplication
cut run times by an order of magnitude. Figure 5.28 (page 96) shows proxy failure
shaping results on size 32 matrices.
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As with criticality measurements on the check and add operations, multiply
operations are flat for naive matrix multiply and structured for Strassen’s multiply.
Scalar multiply failure shapes in Strassen’s matrix multiplication algorithm also
have similar distributions to check and add operations. I can still find criticality
spikes roughly 2/7, 3/7 and 5/7 of the way through the algorithm.
Figures 5.25 (page 93), 5.26 (page 94), and 5.27 (page 95) show proxy failure shaping results on check and add failure interfaces using the scalar multiply failure
interface as a proxy. These results are compared to the baseline i.i.d. model results,
and the results from the simple failure shaping procedure applied in Section 5.5.2.
As can be seen, proxy failure shaping can work as well as direct failure shaping.
In this chapter, I only conveyed my immediate impressions concerning the experimental results on matrix and scalar multiplication. In Section 7.2.2 I will explore
the consequences of these data in greater detail and speculate on their meaning.
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Figure 5.1: Scalar Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results. Absolute
log criticality assessment results for both the naive and Karatsuba multiplication
algorithms. The left graphs show results on the common add failure interface, the
middle graphs show results for the check failure interface, and the right graphs show
results for the Karatsuba add interface, which only the Karatsuba algorithm called.
The top graphs are for input size N = 100 while the bottom graphs are for size input
N = 500. The naive multiplication algorithm shows a log-linear growth pattern in
criticality on the check operation and a log-linear growth pattern on half of the add
operation while the Karatsuba algorithm shows a group of three maxima on every
interface. Note that graphs have different x and y axes. See text for details and
Figures 5.2 (page 69), 5.3 (page 70), 5.4 (page 71), 5.5 (page 72), 5.6 (page
73), and 5.7 (page 74) for expanded views of each graph. Reprinted from [1] with
permission.
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Figure 5.2: Expanded Scalar Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results
on NaiveMultiply.add (N=100). See Figure 5.1 (page 68) for details.
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Figure 5.3: Expanded Scalar Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results
on NaiveMultiply.check (N=100). See Figure 5.1 (page 68) for details.
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Figure 5.4: Expanded Scalar Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results
on KaratsubaMultiply.add (N=100). See Figure 5.1 (page 68) for details.
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Figure 5.5: Expanded Scalar Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results
on NaiveMultiply.add (N=500). See Figure 5.1 (page 68) for details.
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Figure 5.6: Expanded Scalar Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results
on NaiveMultiply.check (N=500). See Figure 5.1 (page 68) for details.
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Figure 5.7: Expanded Scalar Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results
on KaratsubaMultiply.add (N=500). See Figure 5.1 (page 68) for details.
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Scalar Multiply Error Results Using Absolute Value
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Figure 5.8: Scalar Multiplication Failure Shaping Results on Absolute
Value. Average error rates for both the naive and Karatsuba multiplication algorithms assessed using average absolute value error measure on input size 100. Assessments were performed on both algorithms using a baseline i.i.d. failure model and
the median value failure shaping technique. See text for details. Reprinted from [1]
with permission.
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Scalar Multiply Error Results Using Log Absolute Value
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Figure 5.9: Scalar Multiplication Failure Shaping Results on Log Absolute
Value. Average error rates for both the naive and Karatsuba multiplication algorithms assessed using average log absolute value error measure on input size 100.
Assessments were performed on both algorithms using a baseline i.i.d. failure model
and the median value failure shaping technique. See text for details. Reprinted
from [1] with permission.
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Scalar Multiply Error Results Using Absolute Percent Value
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Figure 5.10: Scalar Multiplication Failure Shaping Results on Absolute
Percent Value. Average error rates for both the naive and Karatsuba multiplication
algorithms assessed using average absolute percentage value error measure on input
size 100. Assessments were performed on both algorithms using a baseline i.i.d. failure
model and the median value failure shaping technique. Percent value is represented
as a number in [0, 1] and is sensitive to minor changes in its denominator. See text
for details. Reprinted from [1] with permission.
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Algorithm 2: Strassen’s Matrix Multiplication.
1: procedure Strassen(x, y)
2:
3:

if N == 1 then
return [[x[0][0]y[0][0]]]

4:

end if

5:

a = x[0 : N/2][0 : N/2]

6:

b = x[0 : N/2][N/2 + 1 : N ]

7:

c = x[N/2 + 1 : N ][0 : N/2]

8:

d = x[N/2 + 1 : N ][N/2 + 1 : N ]

9:

e = y[0 : N/2][0 : N/2]

10:

f = y[0 : N/2][N/2 + 1 : N ]

11:

g = y[N/2 + 1 : N ][0 : N/2]

12:

h = y[N/2 + 1 : N ][N/2 + 1 : N ]

13:

p1 = Strassen(a, f − h)

14:

p2 = Strassen(a + b, h)

15:

p3 = Strassen(c + d, e)

16:

p4 = Strassen(d, g − e)

17:

p5 = Strassen(a + d, e + h)

18:

p6 = Strassen(b − d, g + h)

19:

p7 = Strassen(a − c, e + f )

20:

z[0 : N/2][0 : N/2] = p5 + p4 − p2 + p6

21:

z[0 : N/2][N/2 + 1 : N ] = p1 + p2

22:

z[N/2 + 1 : N ][0 : N/2] = p3 + p4

23:

z[N/2 + 1 : N ][N/2 + 1 : N ] = p1 + p5 − p3 − p7

24:

return z

25: end procedure

. x and y are size N × N
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Figure 5.11: Matrix Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results. Criticality results for both naive and Strassen’s matrix multiplication. The left graphs
show log Frobenius norm, the middle graphs show Frobenius norm, and the right
graphs show infinity norm results. The graphs on the top are for matrix input size
4, the middle set are at size 8 and the bottom set are at size 16. Naive results are
omitted in the four graphs towards the bottom right to emphasize similar structures
in Strassen’s algorithm at multiple scales. Note that x and y axes do not match
for every graph. Each error measure is valued in its own units. See text for details
and Figures 5.12 (page 80), 5.13 (page 81), 5.14 (page 82), 5.15 (page 83), 5.16
(page 84), 5.17 (page 85), 5.18 (page 86), 5.19 (page 87), and 5.20 (page 88) for
expanded views of each graph. Reprinted from [1] with permission.
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Figure 5.12: Expanded Log Frobenius Norm Matrix Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results on NaiveMultiply.check (N=4). See Figure 5.11
(page 79) for details.
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Figure 5.13: Expanded Frobenius Norm Matrix Multiplication Criticality
Assessment Results on NaiveMultiply.add (N=4). See Figure 5.11 (page 79)
for details.
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Figure 5.14: Expanded Infinity Norm Matrix Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results on NaiveMultiply.check (N=4). See Figure 5.11 (page 79)
for details.
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Figure 5.15: Expanded Log Frobenius Norm Matrix Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results on NaiveMultiply.check (N=8). See Figure 5.11
(page 79) for details.
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Figure 5.16: Expanded Frobenius Norm Strassen’s Criticality Assessment
Results on NaiveMultiply.add (N=8). See Figure 5.11 (page 79) for details.
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Figure 5.17: Expanded Infinity Norm Strassen’s Criticality Assessment Results on NaiveMultiply.check (N=8). See Figure 5.11 (page 79) for details.
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Figure 5.18: Expanded Log Frobenius Norm Matrix Multiplication Criticality Assessment Results on NaiveMultiply.check (N=16). See Figure 5.11
(page 79) for details.
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Figure 5.19: Expanded Frobenius Norm Strassen’s Criticality Assessment
Results on NaiveMultiply.add (N=16). See Figure 5.11 (page 79) for details.
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Figure 5.20: Expanded Infinity Norm Strassen’s Criticality Assessment Results on NaiveMultiply.check (N=16). See Figure 5.11 (page 79) for details.
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Criticality of NaiveMultiply.check on Log Frobenius Norm (N=16)
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Figure 5.21: Focused Log Frobenius Norm Criticality Results. Log Frobenius norm structures continue to persist at larger input scales. See text for details.
Reprinted from [1] with permission.
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Criticality of NaiveMultiply.multiply on Frobenius Norm (N=4)
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Figure 5.22: Matrix Multiplication Proxy Method Criticality Assessment
Results on Input Size N=4. Criticality results for both naive and Strassen’s
algorithms on the scalar multiplication failure interface using Frobenius norm error
measure at matrix input size N=4. See text for details. Reprinted from [1] with
permission.
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Criticality of NaiveMultiply.multiply on Frobenius Norm (N=8)
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Figure 5.23: Matrix Multiplication Proxy Method Criticality Assessment
Results on Input Size N=8. Criticality results for both naive and Strassen’s
algorithms on the scalar multiplication failure interface using Frobenius norm
error measure at matrix input size N=8. See text for details. Reprinted from [1]
with permission.
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Criticality of NaiveMultiply.multiply on Frobenius Norm (N=16)
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Figure 5.24: Matrix Multiplication Proxy Method Criticality Assessment
Results on Input Size N=16. Criticality results for both naive and Strassen’s
algorithms on the scalar multiplication failure interface using Frobenius norm
error measure at matrix input size N=16. See text for details. Reprinted from [1]
with permission.
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Matrix Multiply Error Results Using Frobenius Norm (N=16)
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Figure 5.25: Matrix Multiplication Proxy Failure Shaping Results on Frobenius Norm. Average error rates for both the naive and Strassen’s algorithms assessed using Frobenius norm error measure at input size 16. Assessments were performed on both algorithms using a baseline i.i.d. failure model, the direct failure
shaping technique, and the proxy method failure shaping technique. We see error
reductions between 38% and 63%. See text for details. Reprinted from [1] with
permission.
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Matrix Multiply Error Results Using Inﬁnity Norm (N=16)
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Figure 5.26: Matrix Multiplication Proxy Failure Shaping Results on Infinity Norm. Average error rates for both the naive and Strassen’s algorithms
assessed using infinity norm error measure at input size 16. Assessments were performed on both algorithms using a baseline i.i.d. failure model, the direct failure
shaping technique, and the proxy method failure shaping technique. See text for
details. Reprinted from [1] with permission.
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Matrix Multiply Error Results Using Log Frobenius Norm (N=16)
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Figure 5.27: Matrix Multiplication Proxy Failure Shaping Results on Log
Frobenius Norm. Average error rates for both the naive and Strassen’s algorithms
assessed using frobenius norm error measure at input size 16. Assessments were
performed on both algorithms using a baseline i.i.d. failure model, the direct failure
shaping technique, and the proxy method failure shaping technique. See text for
details. Reprinted from [1] with permission.
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presents similar structures at input size 32 as at smaller input scales. On the right I present proxy failure shaping

present the criticality assessment for proxy failure interface scalar multiply on the infinity norm error measure. It

Figure 5.28: Proxy Criticality Assessment and Failure Shaping Results on Input Size 32. On the left I

Samples

Criticality of NaiveMultiply.multiply (N=32)
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6.3

Introduction

Using insights gained from Chapter 4, in this chapter I present a formal theory of
scalable robustness oriented around the idea that scalably robust programs should
have an output error that approaches zero as the internal i.i.d. failure rate of components running the program approaches zero and program input size approaches
infinity.
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Scalable Robustness Defined

We ask if an algorithm is scalably robust in a particular context, which is a combination of an input generator, a failure model, and an error measure as in Chapters 4
and 5. Scalable robustness is a property of a (program, context)1 pair, which I call
an assessment. In a scalably robust assessment the final output error goes to zero
as the component failure rate vanishes, even as the input size grows without bound.
As a result, in a scalably robust assessment we can bound output error rates over
all large scales by bounding per component failure rates to a constant.

6.4.1

Average-Case Scalable Robustness

Though they fail to capture more complex failures such as device aging or attack,
i.i.d. (independent, identically distributed) errors are a simple and physically plausible model of background noise and hence I treat them as the average-case failure
model.
Definition 1. (A, err) is average-case scalably robust, written ACSRiid (A, err), if:


lim +
E [err(A (i), A(i))] = 0
(N,)→(+∞,0 )

i∈IN

where N is an input size, A is an algorithm, err(O , Oc ) is a context-dependent error
measure defined over incorrect and correct algorithm outputs,  is the i.i.d. failure
rate of A’s fallible operations, A (i) is A’s output given input i and  while A(i) is A
run without failures, and IN is the set of all possible inputs of size N .

We assume the context of A is chosen so that Ei∈IN [err(A (i), A(i))] ∈ [0, 1] is
uniquely defined at every (N, ) in N ≥ 0 and 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
1 Since

in this chapter I hold the input generator and fault model constant, I instead
refer to each context only by the error measure it employs.
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We can determine which assessments are ACSR iid by examining the behavior of
the expectation from Definition 1 for all  near 0. To do this we produce an upper
bound on the maximum growth rate of output error, Bδ , for all  ≤ δ, or, similarly,
a lower bound on the minimum growth rate Bδ0 .
Notice that if the upper bound on an assessment’s expectation for  ≤ C is:

BC ∈ O(f ())

(6.1)

where C is a constant and lim→0+ f () = 0, then the assessment is ACSR iid .
Additionally, if

Bδ0 ∈ Ω(f ()g(N ))

(6.2)

where limN →∞ g(N ) = ∞ and  > 0 → f () > 0 then the assessment is not ACSR iid
since a path of f () = 1/g(N ) violates Definition 1.
An immediate consequence of this idea is the following theorem concerning strict
correctness error (SCE):
Theorem 1. (A, SCE) is ACSRi.i.d. for all programs A if the run time of the program is O(f (N )) ∈ ω(c) and each operation is armored with Ω(lg(f (N )))-modular
redundancy.

Proof. We start by bounding the probability of failure on a single redundant operation. We do this by noticing that each operation will perform correctly if more than
half of the redundant components that calculate the operation also perform correctly.
For the number of redundant operations we choose g(n) = 24lg(f (N ))
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Using a multiplicative Chernoff bound, we know that if X is a Bernoulli variable
with mean µ and δ ≥ 1:

P [X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e−δµ/3

Next we let δ = 1/(2) − 1 and we remember that µ = g(N ). Using these we
obtain:

P [X ≥ 1/(2)g(N )] ≤ e−(1/(2)−1)g(N )/3
P [X ≥ (1/2)g(N )] ≤ e−(1/2−)g(N )/3

However if we hold  ≤ 1/4 (and notice that  is positive in the exponent of e)
we then obtain that:

P [X ≥ (1/2)g(N )] ≤ e−(1/2−1/4)g(N )/3 = e−2(g(N )/24) = e−2lg(f (n)) = 1/(f (N )2 )

However, there are f (N ) operations in A and we limited the probability of the
redundant operations failing to 1/(f (N )2 ). Therefore, the expected number of failures is f (N )/(f (N )2 ) or 1/f (N ) which goes to zero as N goes to infinity. Since the
maximum SCE is bound to be smaller than the expected number of failures when
1/f (N ) is less than 1 this proves Theorem 1.

This theorem complements other results that show that O(lgf (N )) redundancy
is a lower bound on the number of redundant operations needed to produce deterministically secure execution for some functions [99, 100].
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Theorem 1 relies on the idea that failures will occur under an i.i.d. model, but that
the per-operation failure rate will decrease with the increasing size of the computation by increasing the number of components performing each operation. However,
to make the redundant computation viable, it is likely that redundant operations
be closely collocated, leading to a higher probability of coordinated failures. Such
coordinated failures, which would impact the final outcome of the program, can be
viewed as producing an i.i.d. failure behavior ‘above’ the modularly redundant and
thus ‘deterministically secure’ Ω(lg(n))-modularly redundant components.
It is this tendency for coordinated failures to occur when operations are collocated
in space that motivates the assumption that some component of programmatic error
rates remain at a very small constant above zero as programs approach large scales.
In the worst case, attackers may use coordinated failures to drive up program error
rates.

6.4.2

Worst-Case Scalable Robustness

I.i.d. faults are a natural simplifying assumption, but we expect higher-order correlated failures to occur as well. In the most general case, no defense is possible against
an unlimited supply of adversarially-chosen faults; here we define worst-case scalable
robustness in terms of adversarial faults restricted only so that their total number is
some given proportion of the program size f (N ):
Definition 2. (A, err) is worst-case scalably robust, written WCSR(A, err), if:

lim

(N,)→(+∞,0+ )

ArgM axi∈IN ,f ∈Ff (N ), err(A (i), A(i)) = 0

with N, A, and err(O ,Oc ) as in Definition 1. f, called a fault pattern [2], is a Boolean
vector indicating which of the fallible computational steps do fail in any given case,
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and Ff (N ), is the set of all fault patterns that each contain no more that f (N ) true
values. Finally, Af (i) is the algorithm A run with operations faulting as called for
in fault pattern f on input i while A(i) is the same program run without failure on
input i.

We use ArgMax in Definition 2 to represent an omniscient attacker causing maximum damage under the given f (N ) and .
As implied by their names, we can show that any algorithm-error measure pair
that is WCSR is also ACSR iid :
Theorem 2. If WCSR(A, err) then ACSRiid (A, err) for all algorithms with growth
rate g(n) ∈ ω(c).

2

Proof. Our error measures send outputs to a numeric values in [0, 1]. Therefore, if
(A, err) are not ACSR iid there is some path p of  and N going to 0+ and +∞ such
that the average error from Definition 1 is at or above some constant C1 > 0 past
infinitely many points along p :  = g(f (N )) where f (n) ∈ ω(c) is the number of
fallible operations in the program and g(f (n)) → 0 as N → +∞.
However, notice that according to Chebyshev’s inequality [101] if X is a random
variable with expected value µ, variance σ, and k > 0 then:

P (|X − µ| ≥ k) ≤ σ 2 /k 2
P (X ≥ µ + k) ≤ σ 2 /k 2

However, for the sum of f (N ) i.i.d. failure variables with failure rate , we know
that µ = f (N ) and that σ 2 = (1 − )f (n), Thus:
2

[3] contained a flawed version of this proof; it is corrected here.
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P (X ≥ f (n) + k) ≤ (1 − )f (n)/k 2 ≤ f (n)/k 2
Now, suppose that I let k = f (n)1/2 which is greater than 0 since f (n) is the
number of operations in A. If we do this we obtain:

p
P (X ≥ f (n) + f (n)) ≤ 
p
P (X ≥ f (n)( + 1/ f (n))) ≤ 

However,  is going to zero. This means that the probability that any item in
p
p
A will be drawn from above the path p :  + 1/ f (n) = g(f (n)) + 1/ f (n) is a
value that approaches zero as (N, ) → (+∞, 0). Thus, because an average cannot lie
above all values in its data set, there must be some specific combination of failures
p
and input with less than g(f (n)) + 1/ f (n) total failures along infinitely many
points on p where err(Af (i)) > C2 > C1 −  > 0 when  drops permanently below
C1 .
Thus, if ¬ACSRiid (A, err) then ¬WCSR(A, err), proving Theorem 2.

6.5

Scalable Robustness on Pairwise-Comparison
Sorting

In applying the theory of scalable robustness to sorting I adopt many of the conventions of Chapter 4. As in that chapter, I presume an input generator that produces
permutations of N distinct data values, and a fault model that allows only data item
comparisons to fail. Though extending the input generator is likely unproblematic—
to add duplicate values, for example—generalizing the fault model significantly would
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require a more detailed machine model in which to express the algorithm implementations, a step I leave for future research. I employ four sorting algorithms—bubble
sort, quicksort, merge sort, and ‘round robin sort’—in this case study of ACSR iid
and WCSR.

6.5.1

Algorithms Old and New

As in Chapter 4 the bubble sort, quicksort, and merge sort algorithms we explore
are largely standard. Although bubble sort implementations (e.g., [94]) commonly
perform N − 1 − P comparisons on pass P through the list, our implementation—
which we call full bubble sort (F BS)—makes all N −1 neighbor-neighbor comparisons
on every pass. My merge sort implementation (M S) is traditional (see, e.g., [34]),
and my quicksort (QS) [93] uses the first item in the list as a pivot—a poor choice
in general but harmless given my adopted input generator.

I call my final algorithm round robin sort (RRS). It is inspired by the round
robin tournament [102], and, while the idea of using round robin comparisons in
sorting is fairly common [103], I haven’t found this exact algorithm in the literature.
RRS steps through each list item comparing that item to all other items. It counts
the number of times that item is greater than other items, and places it in a bin
based on that count. The items are then returned in the order of the bins. Any bin
that has more than one item returns items to the output list in the same order they
appear in the input list.
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ACSRiid Error Growth Rates
Round

Merge

Quick

Bubble

Strict Correctness

Ω(N lgN )

Ω(N lgN )

Ω(N )

Ω(N )

Max Displacement

Ω(N )

Ω(N )

?

?

?

O()

?

O()

Spearman’s Footrule

Robin

Table 6.1: Summary of ACSRiid Results. Where known, each (sorting algorithm,
error measure) assessment is marked with a bound on its expected error measure
growth rate—O() upper bounds for assessments proven ACSR iid , and Ω() lower
bounds for those proven not ACSR iid . Those marked ? are currently unproven,
though empirical data (e.g. Fig. 6.1) suggests they are all ACSR iid . Reprinted from [3]
with permission.

6.6

Average-Case Scalable Robustness on Sorting
Algorithms

ACSR iid illuminates the tension between algorithmic efficiency and robustness. Table 6.1 provides lower bounds on the average error growth rate near 0 (marked with
Ω) for each assessment that is provably not ACSR iid and, similarly, upper bounds
(marked with O) for each assessment that is provably ACSR iid . Assessments that are
currently unevaluated are marked with a ‘?’, though I believe them to be ACSR iid
due to my empirical results. I present proofs for Table 6.1 below.
Theorem 3. (M S, SCE) is not ACSRiid .
Proof. Notice that if any comparison in the merge sort algorithm fails then some
smaller item will be trapped above a larger item leading to an incorrect sort. Further
0
merge sort executes Θ(N lgN ) comparisons. Therefore B1/N
lgN ∈ Ω(N lgN ) since

 = 0 has no error while there be a failure 1/2 time if  ∈ Ω(1/N lgN ).
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Similar proofs can be constructed for quicksort and bubble sort. In the Bubble
Sort proof only the final pass is considered since any incorrect comparison there will
produce an incorrectly sorted output list.
Theorem 4. (RRS, SCE) is not ACSRiid .
Proof. Sometimes, RRS can produce correct output even if one or more items end
up in the wrong bin(s), but the chance of an incorrectly sorted output is at least
1/2 in all such cases. Additionally, items in the top quartile of the list should be
declared ‘greater than’ other items at least three times as often as they are declared
‘less than’ another item. Therefore, if  ≥ 4/N each item in the top quartile will
experience at least 4 failed comparisons 1/2 the time. Each of these items with
4 failed comparisons will be in the wrong bin with probability at least 1/4 due to
the asymmetry in the number of ‘less than’ and ‘greater than’ comparisons they
experience. This means that  ≥ 4/N leads to an expected output error of at least
0
∈ Ω(N ).
1/16 or that B4/N

Next I show that both linearithmic algorithms are not ACSR iid when assessed by
max displacement error.
Theorem 5. (MS, MDE) is not ACSRiid .
Proof. Let the larger item in a failed comparison of merge sort be ` and the smaller
item be s. When a comparison fails, s will always be trapped above ` in any future
lists, including the final list. Further, notice that the disp(s) ≥ dist(s, `) − f ailed(`),
where disp(s) is the displacement of s, dist(s, `) is the distance between s and ` in
a correctly sorted list, and f ailed(`) is the number of times ` experiences a failed
comparison with an item that is smaller than ` but not s.
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In the lowest-depth merges of merge sort, ` and s are random list items. This
means that the expected distance between them is N/2. Additionally, f ailed(`) ≤ N
in expectation because each item is compared with at most N other items. Therefore,
disp(s) ≥ N/2 − N in expectation if ` and s are in the first, lowest, merge. Thus,
the expected error when one of the lowest-depth merges has a failed comparison is at
least (1/2 − )N . Lastly, the probability that one of the lowest merge comparisons
will fail is at least 1/2 when  = 1/N .
By holding 1/N ≤  ≤ 1/4 (which is possible for all N > 4) an output error
0
∈
of approximately 1/8 can always be obtained in expectation implying that B1/N

Ω(N ).
Theorem 6. (QS, MDE) is not ACSRiid .

Proof. Notice that if any comparison in the quicksort algorithm fails on an item x
and pivot p then disp(x) ≥ dist(x, p) + 1 − disp(p) since x will always be placed
above p in the output list. If the failed comparison occurs during the first pass of
the algorithm then

E[disp(x)] ≥ E[dist(x, p) − f ailed(p)]

since x and p are chosen by random processes E[dist(x, p)] = N/2 while
E[f ailed(p)] ≤ N since p is compared to at most N items. From here we can see
0
that B1/N
∈ Ω(N ) using arguments similar to those in Theorem 5.

Next I prove that quicksort is ACSR iid .
Theorem 7. (QS, SFE) is ACSRiid .
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Proof. To prove that Definition 1 holds for (QS,SFE) we notice that it is sufficient
to show that:

E[SF E(QS (IN ), IN )] ≤ 

O(N 2 )
∈ O()
Θ(N 2 )

(6.3)

We will show this by bounding the marginal expected error —termed M (x)—for
each list item as it flows through the quicksort algorithm. Throughout this proof will
call the pivot at depth d, pd , and the sublist sorted on that pivot Spd . Now, we will
bound the expected marginal error introduced by failed comparisons on list item x
when x is a non-pivot. If we call the final depth of x before it becomes a pivot f then
as x flows through the algorithm, it will be a member of a number of sublists—Sp0 ,
Sp1 ,...,Spf , Sx . In each of these sublists, the marginal unnormalized SF E introduced
by a failed comparison is bounded by 2|Sp |—|Sp | from x being misplaced above or
below p and |Sp | for each other item in the sublist being shifted up or down one space
due to x’s misplacement.
Since each comparison fails with a probability of  and each list item is compared
with each pivot exactly once before it becomes a pivot we can treat the failure of each
of the comparisons between x and its pivot p as a Bernoulli variable with probability
. Using 2|Sp | as a bound on the marginal error on each comparison with p we see
that

M (x) ≤ 2

f
X

E[|Spd |]

(6.4)

d=0

We say that x participates in a successful split if x is sent to a sublist of length no
greater than 1/2 of the previous list. Since the pivot and x are both random items
in the sublist, the probability that x participates in a successful split at each level of
the quicksort recursion is at least 1/2.
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At a recursive depth of d, this means that we can bound the expected length of
the sublist in which x appears. We know that the probability that x participates in

q successful pivots at recursive depth d is at least dq (1/2)d . We also know that if x
participated in q successful pivots then |Spd | is at most length N (1/2)q . Therefore,

P
the length of sublist at recursive depth d is at most di=0 di (1/2)d N (1/2)i . Using
the binomial theorem this shows that E[|Spd |] ≤ (3/4)d .
Using Equation 6.4 and summing over infinitely many possible depths we can
show that M (X) ≤ 8N . Therefore, the total expected unnormalized Spearman’s
footrule error is bound by O(N 2 ) since there are N items in the list. Finally, the
normalization factor for Spearman’s footrule error is Θ(N 2 ) and as such we obtain
Inequality 6.3 and show BC ∈ O().

I also present Theorem 8 which relates ACSR iid under SF E to ACSR iid under
M DE.
Theorem 8. ACSRiid (A, M DE) → ACSRiid (A, SF E).

Proof. Consider that

E[SF E(A (IN ), IN )]O(N 2 ) ≤
O(N )E[M DE(A (IN ), IN )]

(6.5)

Since unnormalized SFE is simply the sum of the displacement of every item in the list
and the normalization factor of MDE is O(N). However, we know that Inequality 6.5
implies that ACSRiid (A, M DE) → ACSRiid (A, SF E).
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This theorem was paired with the purported, but mistaken, theorem that (RRS,
MDE) is ACSR iid in [3] to obtain that (RRS, SFE) is also ACSR iid . We do know that
ACSR iid (RRS, SFE) is correct anyway, however, because of Theorem 2 combined
with Theorem 14 from the next chapter, concerning (RRS, SFE) behavior in the
worst case.
Figure 6.1 presents data suggesting that the scalably robust assessments’ averagecase output error grows at a consistent rate, even as input sizes increase. Alternatively, assessments that are not scalably robust present ever-sharper ‘knees’ as input
size grows. Each panel of Figure 6.1 shows the i.i.d. average-case error behavior of
the sorting algorithms under SCE (left), M DE (middle), and SF E (right) for lists
of size 100, 1000, 10000, and 100000. Each data point in the panels represents the
error measure at a given list size and , averaged over the number of runs shown.
Notice how all four algorithms experience a knee as  goes from 0% to 0.1% under
SCE, while only quicksort and merge sort experience such a knee under M DE.
Finally, no algorithm experiences a knee under SF E. Assessments that are not scalably robust jump quickly from mostly correct to mostly incorrect when input sizes
are large enough.

6.7

Worst-Case Scalable Robustness on the Sorting Algorithms

A synopsis of my theoretical exploration of WCSR on the sorting algorithms can be
found in Table 6.2 (page 119).
Theorem 2 shows that none of the four algorithms is WCSR when assessed by
SCE because none are ACSR iid under SCE. The same method proves that merge
sort and quicksort are not WCSR under M DE. In Theorems 9 and 10 we show that
neither of the quadratic algorithms is WCSR in an assessment with M DE.
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MDE: Max Displacement Error

SFE: Spearman’s Footrule Error

1

0.07

0.9

0.06

0.8

0.6
0.4
0.2

0.7

Average SFE

Average MDE

Average SCE

0.8

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2

0

0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02
Failure Rate

0

0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01

0.1

0

0.05

0

0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02
Failure Rate

0

0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02
Failure Rate

1000 Runs

MS 1e2

QS 1e2

FBS 1e2

RRS 1e2

1000 Runs

MS 1e3

QS 1e3

FBS 1e3

RRS 1e3

100 Runs

MS 1e4

QS 1e4

FBS 1e4

RRS 1e4

10 Runs

MS 1e5

QS 1e5

FBS 1e5

RRS 1e5

Figure 6.1: Summary of Empirical Results. Measured average error rates for
merge sort (MS), quicksort (QS), full bubble sort (FBS), and round robin sort
(RRS), assessed according to strict correctness error (SCE, left), max displacement
error (MDE, middle), and Spearman’s footrule error (SFE, right, note changed y
scale), plotted vs the failure rate and at input sizes from 100 to 100,000 (1e2..1e5).
See text for details. Reprinted from [3] with permission.
Theorem 9. (FBS, MDE) is not WCSR.

Proof. Consider the case where the input list is reverse sorted. Suppose an attacker
flips the (N/2)th comparison on each of the N passes. Then, no item that starts in
the bottom half of the list will ever move to the top half including the largest item
which will have a displacement of at least 1/2. Since we only fault N of the N 2
comparisons carried out by bubble sort,  approaches 0 as N approaches ∞.
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Figure 6.2: Merge Sort WCSR Strategy: The attacker faults comparisons with
the largest item until the list is shaped with all the largest items excluding the largest
item (Z) in the first half, and all the smallest items preceded by Z in the second half.
The final merge compares items across the red-dashed line. Reprinted from [3] with
permission.
Theorem 10. (RRS, MDE) is not WCSR.

Proof. Notice that if an attacker faults every comparison of the largest item in the
list and no others then the max displacement error will be at least 1 − 1/N while
epsilon follows the path of  = O(1/N ).

In Theorems 11 through 13 we show that merge sort, quicksort and full bubble
sort are not WCSR when paired with Spearman’s footrule error.
Theorem 11. (MS, SFE) is not WCSR.

Proof. We start with list that is reverse sorted except that the largest item is in the
second half of the list. The attacker then faults every comparison that the largest
item participates in. At the final merge the list is split into two groups: the first
group having the largest N/2 directly beneath the largest item sorted in order, and
the second group having the smallest N/2 − 1 items in the list, preceded by the
largest item which is either the first item in the second half of the list, or directly in
the middle of the list. See Figure 6.2.
In the final merge, however, no item will switch places if no comparisons are
faulted.
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N (N −2)/2
Θ(N 2 )

because each item is a distance of at least (N − 2)/2 away from its correct position.
As N approaches infinity this value is strictly greater than 0. This occurs with only
Θ(lg(N )) faulted comparisons (the failed comparisons of the largest item on each of
O(lgN ) merges before the final merge). Thus a path of  ∈ Θ(1/lgN ) exists such
that Definition 2 is violated.

6.7.1

Quicksort—Spearman’s Footrule Error

Theorem 12. (QS, SFE) is not WCSR.
Proof. Consider that if the middle item of the sorted list in quicksort is the first
pivot and every one of the N comparisons that pivot participates in are faulted then
all of the largest items will be in the first half of the output list and all the smallest
items will be in the second half of the output list. As result the Spearman’s footrule
error will be above roughly 1/2 while epsilon follows a path of  ∈ Θ(1/lgN ).

6.7.2

Bubble Sort—Spearman’s Footrule Error

Theorem 13. (FBS, SFE) is not WCSR.
Proof. Using the same attacks as in Theorem 9 shows that (FBS,SFE) is not WCSR.

Finally, we show that round robin sort is WCSR when assessed in a context with
Spearman’s Footrule Error.
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Round Robin Sort—Spearman’s Footrule Error

Theorem 14. (RRS, SFE) is WCSR.

Proof. To prove that RRS is WCSR, we will use an inductive amortization analysis
[104] to show that the amount of unnormalized Spearman’s footrule error, referred
to as U SF E throughout this proof, is bounded by a function that is proportional to
the number of failed comparisons. Since the normalization factor of U SF E is Θ(N 2 )
and the number of comparisons in RRS is also Θ(N 2 ), this will suffice to show that
(RRS, SF E) is worst-case scalably robust. Note that this proof relies on the fact
that all items in the input list are distinct.
We begin with some definitions necessary for our proof:
Definition 3. Bin(k) = k is the bin of the k th list item when the list is correctly
sorted and Bini,f (k) is the bin of the k th list item when input i is sorted under some
fault pattern f .
Next we define the drift of items during a faulty run of the RRS algorithm in
Definition 4.
Definition 4. Di,f (X) = |Bini,f (X)−Bin(X)| is an item’s drift under fault pattern
P
f and input i. To simplify our notation we say that ∆i,f = ∀X∈i Di,f (X).
An item’s drift is equal to the number of bins it has shifted away from its ‘correct’
bin during the RRS algorithm. Using drift we can obtain Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. ∆i,f ≤ |i|(|i| − 1) = N (N − 1) when |i| = N .

Proof. For an item to have a drift of Di,f (X), it must have experienced at least
Di,f (X) failed comparisons during its pass of the RRS algorithm. Further, the
number of failed comparisons of the RRS algorithm must be less than or equal to
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|i|(|i| − 1) since this is a worst-case analysis. Therefore, ∆i,f ≤ N (N − 1) when
|i| = N .

Next we examine the broken orderings—the number of pairs of items that are
misordered with respect to each other—in the output.
Definition 5. Let P osi,f (X) be the position of item X in the output of RRS run on
input i and fault pattern f . Then:

Bi,f (X, Y ) =



1

X < Y ∧ P osi,f (X) > P osi,f (Y )


0

otherwise

is a broken ordering function of RRS. To simplify our notation we say that:
βi,f =

X

X

Bi,f (X, Y )

X∈i Y ∈i,Y >X

The U SF E is bound by a function that is proportional to the number of broken
orderings, which we show in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. U SF E(RRSf (i)) ≤ 2βi,f

Proof. When an item is displaced by L in either direction in the output it must
participate in at least L distinct broken orderings. Additionally, at most 2 items
can participate in each distinct broken ordering. Finally, U SF E is the sum of the
displacement of every item in the output. Therefore, by the pigeonhole principle
U SF E(RRSf (i)) ≤ 2βi,f .
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The number of broken orderings, however, is directly related to the total drift of
all items during a faulty run of the RRS algorithm. We show this in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. βi,f ≤ 2∆i,f .
Proof. Assign to each item X a purse containing CX = 2Di,f (X) credits. X goes
bankrupt if it ever has a negative number of credits. We proceed by showing an
inductive procedure by which all items can pay for all broken orderings without any
item going bankrupt.
Base Case: Let X1 , X2 , ..., Xv all have drift DM , the largest drift of all items.
Then each of these items can participate in at most 2DM broken orderings since no
item has a drift greater than DM (and thus cannot be further than DM bins from
its correct bin).
Therefore, each of the X 0 s can pay for all of the broken orderings they participate
in with their own credits and none of them will go bankrupt.
Inductive Hypothesis: We will assume the following for this inductive proof:
(1) Items with drifts greater than D have paid for all the broken orderings they
have participated in.
(2) None of the items with drift greater than D have gone bankrupt.
Notice that this true of the base case.
Inductive Step: Now, given the inductive hypothesis we will show that:
(1) Items with drifts greater than or equal to D have paid for all the broken
orderings they have participated in.
(2) None of the items with drift greater than or equal to D have gone bankrupt.
Notice that if X1 , X2 , ..., Xv have drifts of exactly D, then they do not have to
pay for any broken orderings they may participate in with an item that has more

Chapter 6. Scalable Robustness

118

than D drift. Therefore, they are only responsible for broken orderings with items
that have D or less drift. However, each of the X 0 s can only participate in at most
2D such broken orderings since there are only 2D items within D correct bins of
each of these items.
Thus both (1) and (2) hold from the inductive hypothesis to the inductive step.
Conclusion:
Therefore, since (1) all broken orderings can be paid for by some item, (2) each
item X has only 2Di,f (X) credits to pay with, and (3) no item goes bankrupt, then
βi,f ≤ 2∆i,f .

By our three lemmas we can see that

∀i ∈ IN , f ∈ FN, U SF E(RRSf (i), i) ≤ 4N (N − 1)

(6.6)

However, the normalization factor for U SF E is Θ(N 2 ) and therefore:

∀i ∈ IN , f ∈ FN, SF E(RRSf (i), i) ≤ Θ(C)

(6.7)

and since Θ(C) goes to 0 as  goes to 0, (RRS, SF E) is W CSR.
In Chapter 7 I will explore the consequences of these theorems in greater detail
and speculate on their meaning.
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Worst-Case Scalable Robustness Results
Round

Merge

Quick

Bubble

Strict Correctness

X

X

X

X

Max Displacement

X

X

X

X

Spearman’s Footrule

X

X

X

Robin

!

Table 6.2: Summary of WCSR Results. Each (algorithm, context) pair marked
with an X is provably not WCSR. The Θ(N 2 ) round robin sort algorithm, when
paired with the Spearman’s footrule error context, stands out as the only algorithm
that is WCSR. Reprinted from [3] with permission.
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Chapter 7
Discussion

7.1

Summary of Work

In this dissertation I explored empirical and theoretical behaviors of deterministic algorithms subject to failures that they cannot avoid. I explored the behavior of sorting
algorithms subject to faulty comparisons, while my study on matrix multiplication
algorithms made use of faulty bit checks, add statements, and scalar multiplication
steps. I also built a general tool named Criticality Explorer, and I used it to evaluate
the matrix multiplication algorithms. Finally, using my criticality observations on
sorting algorithms as a guide, I developed a theoretical framework called scalable
robustness to identify algorithms and error measures that degrade gracefully.
I also created a notion of “failure point” focused on measuring computational
failures in both time and space. To support this concept I created method-level failure
interfaces—generalizable descriptions of failure behavior for methods that allow for
the study of algorithmic robustness to failures, separate from, and without detailed
knowledge of, any specific hardware platform. I also bucketed method failures by
time, allowing me to observe algorithmic responses to failures that occur at otherwise
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seemingly equivalent operations throughout the algorithmic life cycle.
My measures of algorithmic robustness appropriated old domain-specific measures as output error measures. For sorting I employed presortedness, a traditional
measure of problem difficulty used to evaluate list sort error. In matrix multiplication I used Infinity, Frobenius and log Frobenius error between matrices, measures
that are used to evaluate matrix modeling error [105]. These error measures made
it possible to observe complex algorithmic failure responses, by removing the barrier
imposed by the strict correctness standard. Using the results of these analyses I
was able to economize algorithmic resources in a way that decreased overall output
error in a resource-constrained environment that didn’t allow for the correction of
all failures.
All together, from this work I draw the following conclusions concerning computational robustness.

7.2

Questions Answered

The major research questions of this dissertation were:

• How do measures of correctness hide or uncover interesting failure dynamics
inside algorithms?
• How are an algorithm’s failure dynamics related to the algorithm’s known behavior?
• Is it possible to use an analysis of failure dynamics to improve algorithmic
performance in resource-constrained environments?
• Which operations respond well to this method?
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In the rest of this section I walk through my conclusions on each of these questions.
I also present speculations on two additional questions that arose during the course
of the study:
• How does numerical stability relate to matrix multiplication results?
• When Will Criticality Structures Scale Effectively?

7.2.1

Strict Correctness Hides Criticality Structure While
Quantified Correctness Reveals It

Figure 4.1 (page 54) shows estimated criticalities under the strict correctness error
measure. We can use this figure to understand some of the liabilities of all-or-nonecorrectness. While the figure does make clear that quick and merge sorts perform
many fewer comparisons than bubble sort, little other structure is revealed. Despite
averaging over random input permutations, the strict correctness criticality of each
comparison is usually either 1 or 0: Any given comparison is either maximally critical or not at all critical. Given 0% background failures (red curve), for example,
there will only be a single failure. For bubble sort, a failure is critical if that failure
is in any of the last N comparisons (seen at about comparison 2600), but otherwise
it’s harmless. By contrast, with merge and quicksorts almost every comparison is
critical. The last comparisons for quick and merge sorts show intermediate criticalities because, depending on the specific input permutation tested, the algorithm will
sometimes finish before that comparison is reached, so a failure at that comparison
index is sometimes harmless.
Given strict correctness, if the background failure rate is appreciably non-zero
(e.g., 20%, blue curve) all comparisons became non-critical in all three algorithms:
Since the output will never be strictly correct, the occurrence or absence of any one
failure makes no difference.The one major exception to this strict correct rule is full
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bubble sort which does not have every operation presenting full criticality at a 0%
background failure rate, but only the last n operations. This is an interesting partial
exception to Hypothesis 1.4.1 that suggests that for some inefficient algorithms the
most interesting criticality behavior may be apparent under SCE.
However, if we look at Figures 4.2 (page 55), 4.3 (page 56), 4.4 (page 57), 5.1
(page 68), or 5.11 (page 79) we see many instances where error structures seem to be
revealed by quantified correctness measures. The major exception is the brute force
naive matrix multiplication which seems to present a very flat criticality measure for
each operation even when measured by quantified correctness measures.

7.2.2

Criticality Structure Seems Related to Known Algorithmic Behaviors

In most of the algorithms I have presented, the observed criticality structures seem
to be related to the known behaviors of the algorithms under consideration. We can
see this in the each of the sorting algorithms: merge sort, quick sort, and bubble
sort; as well as in the multiplication algorithms.

Merge Sort
In Figure 4.2 (page 55) we see average conditional Spearman’s footrule error (positional error) and criticality for the merge sort algorithm. The criticality of a failure
at a given comparison index—illustrated in the middle graph—is equal to the difference between the top and bottom lines in the first graph of Figure 4.2—the estimated
error when the failures does occur less that when it doesn’t.
We should note two striking aspects in the middle graph in Figure 4.2. First,
the positional error measure seems to reveal a fractal criticality structure for the
merge sort algorithm. In retrospect, at least, this makes sense given the depth-
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first recursion used in my merge sort implementation. Comparisons at the deepest
recursive levels—when two items are merged into a length 2 sublist—are also the
most critical comparisons; the deeper “criticality valleys” reflect the larger merges.
Second, that recursive criticality structure is persistent across background failure
rates. Even at a background failure rate of 20% we can still see four distinct ‘bumps’
in merge sort’s criticality results. This implies that criticality structure is robust
when the right algorithm and error measure are used. Note that the criticality falls
off at larger background failure rates since criticality measures additional error due
to a fault and at higher background failure rates so much damage has already been
done to the output that it becomes difficult for failures to do even more damage.
Next, when comparing the middle graph of Figure 4.2 (page 55) to the bottom
graph we see that max displacement error reveals a structure that is similar to
that revealed by positional error. However, the structure of max displacement error
collapses as the number of background errors increases. This seems to present max
displacement error as an interesting intermediary between strict correctness error
and Spearman’s footrule error, a conclusion which is also supported by Theorem 8
(page 110) in Chapter 6.

Quicksort
If we move beyond merge sort to look at quicksort paired with quantified correctness
measures, as in Figure 4.3 (page 56), we see similar structured results as in merge
sort: With Spearman’s footrule error criticality, the first N = 52 comparisons have
much greater criticalities than all other comparisons in the sort. This occurs because
the first N comparisons of quicksort are responsible for sorting the list into a ‘top’
half and ‘bottom’ half with all items less than the pivot in the bottom half and all
items greater than the pivot in the top half. A failed comparison in the first N
comparisons leads to the miscompared item being placed, on average, about N/2
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away from its correct position.
On the other hand, for inversions error criticality, the first N comparisons have
lower criticalities than all other comparisons. I suspect this is because items misplaced in either the top or bottom half of the list will tend to move toward the center
where the halves meet, so even many failures in the first N comparisons will tend to
add only a single inversion to the error measure.
Though Spearman’s footrule error and inversions error, like all the list error
measures explored in this dissertation, agree on the meaning of ‘correctly sorted’,
they measure different list properties, and their criticality structures are sometimes
quite different. While we may hope to find general principles, it is important to
understand that a wise choice of error measure requires not only sensitivity to failures,
but also to the needs of a computation’s end-user.
In Figure 4.3 (page 56) the spikes at the beginning of the first two passes through
the list seem anomalous and at this time I do not have an explanation for their
existence.

Bubble Sort
Next, consider the bubble sort results in Figure 4.4 (page 57). Bubble sort’s O(N 2 )
comparisons give it a great deal of redundancy, so the criticalities in Figure 4.4
are much smaller than in, say, Figure 4.3 (page 56). In addition, the details of its
criticality structures emerge at high background failure rates. It is unsurprising that
bubble sort’s last N comparisons are its most critical as any failed comparison in
the last N operations cannot be corrected, but I hadn’t anticipated the small but
distinct length N periodic structure throughout bubble sort’s execution, indicating
increased criticality in the last half of each pass through the list.
All three sorting algorithms displayed structures related to the input size of N =
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52: First N criticality in quicksort, last N criticality in merge sort, and a period N
variation in bubble sort.

Scalar Multiplication

In Figure 5.1 we see how operations in scalar multiplication algorithms relate to
algorithm output. For naive multiplication, criticalities appear to grow logarithmically as the algorithm proceeds through one of the multiplicands, summing the other
multiplicand depending on the results of each check operation. Alternatively, for
Karatsuba multiply we can observe a constellation of three maxima in the graph
of operation criticality at 0, 100 and 250 check or add operations at multiplication
scale N = 500. Similarly, between the maxima we seem to observe similar, fractal
maxima at smaller scales. This makes sense for an algorithm that works by recursively splitting each multiplication operation into three sub-operations. There is a
replication of patterns at size 100 and size 500; this suggests that more investigation
is warranted.
In Figures 5.8 (page 75), 5.9 (page 76), and 5.10 (page 77) I show failure shaped
error results against i.i.d. failure model outcomes for each failure interface and error
measure at input size 100. Failure shaping cuts the average absolute logarithmic
failure by about 30. It cuts the absolute value and absolute percent value by between
10% and 90%. Further, the Karatsuba algorithm benefits more from failure shaping
than naive multiply. A possible reason for the discrepancy between the absolute value
and its logarithmic version is due to the high standard error of the sampling procedure
using this time based criticality technique. Most multiplication runs for both naive
and Karatsuba multiply had failure-shaped error outputs that were many orders of
magnitude lower than non-failure-shaped error outputs. However, a small number
did not have such great improvements and it is these instances that dominate the
absolute value measurement while having very little impact on the log absolute value
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error measure. In some sense, these instances are not successfully failure shaped.

Matrix Multiplication
Figure 5.11 (page 79) presents results for our two matrix multiplication algorithms.
For naive matrix multiply we don’t see much criticality structure—criticality appears
flat. However, for Strassen’s algorithm we do see spikes that appear about 2/7, 3/7
and 5/7 of the way through the algorithm. This makes sense if we consider that the
algorithm works by splitting the input matrices into 8 parts and recursing 7 times to
obtain its speed up, though the reason for the spikes on these specific ranges of 1/7
of program run time is unclear. We also observe that this structure holds not only
for scalar multiplication proxy operations, but it also holds across multiple input
sizes, suggesting that criticality at small scales may be useful in evaluating criticality
at larger scales, at least for Strassen’s algorithm. In naive matrix multiply, each
scalar multiplication has an equal impact on the output, and its criticality structure
is correspondingly flat.

7.2.3

Algorithmic Performance in Resource-Constrained Environments Is Improved Through Failure Dynamic
Analysis

Reviewing Figures 5.8 (page 75), 5.9 (page 76), 5.10 (page 77), 5.25 (page 93), 5.26
(page 94), and 5.27 (page 95) we can see that it is indeed possible to decrease total
output error in resource-constrained environments by using criticality assessment
results. However, two conditions must be met for this to work. First, the failure
shapes of the algorithms must contain high leverage—a measure of the difference
between critical and non-critical operations in a program. Second, the representation
of failures needs to be compact—short compared to the run time of the algorithm—

Chapter 7. Discussion

128

and present us with low variance.

The Importance of Leverage
I call the ratio of the average criticalities of a program’s important and unimportant
operations its leverage. I use the median failure point criticality as the dividing line
between important and unimportant operations, however other policies may perform
better for other algorithms and economizations. Leverage is thus a rough-and-ready
hint of the improvements possible via my implementation of failure shaping.
In Figure 7.1 the leverage of both naive and Strassen’s matrix multiply using the
Frobenius norm are presented. Strassen’s matrix multiply shows a higher leverage
than naive matrix multiplication, which also outperforms Strassen’s matrix multiplication on baseline i.i.d. failure tests. However, because Strassen’s algorithm has
higher leverage, it also responds better to the failure shaping procedure.
The evidence is more murky with the scalar multiplication algorithms. This may
be due to the the large constant term in Karatsuba’s growth rate. In the limit,
Karatsuba is more efficient than naive scalar multiply, but at my experiment scales
it was less efficient. Larger experiments are necessary to resolve the question of
leverage in scalar multiplication algorithms. However, Karatsuba’s leverage does
seem to pick up as we move from 200 to 500 bits, indicating that at larger scales
Karatsuba’s leverage may be higher than naive multiplication’s.
Overall, economic failure shaping seems best suited to computations that
1. perform multiple fallible steps,
2. each of which has a definable cost,
3. at definable failure rates, with
4. high leverage, and
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Figure 7.1: Selected Leverage Results. Log absolute value leverages on both naive
and Karatsuba scalar multiplication algorithms are presented on the left. Frobenius
norm leverage results on the matrix multiply algorithms are presented on the right.
Note that Karatsuba leverage on check and add operations seems to dip before
picking up and growing above naive scalar multiply’s check leverage at scale 500.
Strassen’s algorithm leverage on all operations grows faster than naive matrix multiply’s leverage on any operation. Note that graphs have different x and y axes. See
text for details. Reprinted from [1].
5. limited overall resources.

Although satisfying most of these conditions is a matter of framing the question,
condition 4 depends on the underlying algorithms. However, I do find that high
efficiency algorithms often have high leverage. This is true in sorting: The more
efficient algorithms have much higher max criticalities than the O(N 2 ) full bubble
sort algorithm. Intuitively, this makes sense, as efficiency often depends on making
high-impact decisions about the output based on examining as little data as possible
at the decision point.
To satisfy the other four conditions, we seek out the operations that are most
heavily impacted when increasing algorithmic efficiency. So, for example, compar-
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isons in sorting, and scalar multiplications in matrix multiplication are both economized as algorithms become more efficient. In addition, looking beyond the algorithms explored in this work, graph algorithms often economize on the number of
vertex or edge traversals necessary to produce a correct output.

Assessment Compactness and Variance

Failure points with high variance occur when many different kinds of execution paths
overlap, some important and some unimportant while compact descriptions grow no
more quickly than the algorithm they are describing. There is a necessary tension
between these two concepts.
For my study, failure points were bucketed by method name and invocation count.
An alternative bucketing might be to evaluate every possible execution path on every
possible input for its error outcome. Such a bucketing would, undoubtedly, have low
variance, however, it would not be compact. By contrast, a bucketing that lumps all
errors together would be very compact, but would have high variance.
My failure interfaces produce compact space-time descriptions. However, variances on the scalar multiplication algorithms were high enough to make failure shaping difficult. Too many high variance and high impact add operations fail for the
full expected usefulness of failure shaping to appear anywhere on the scalar multiplication algorithms except on the log absolute value score. That score calculates
logarithms before performing averages. Thus unusual experiment runs with scores
orders of magnitude greater or lower than the average experiment, have a lower
impact there than on the absolute value error measure.
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Bulk Program Operations Make Good Choice for Failure Shaping

The operations I used in this work are often used to determine lower bounds on
algorithmic efficiency—comparisons in sorting and check and add operations in multiplication. These operations often make up the bulk of an algorithm’s run time
and are also often somewhat parallelizable. So far operations from this category appear to be useful for failure shaping, excluding naive algorithms like bubble sort and
naive matrix multiplication. This hypothesis, however, could use a greater degree of
support beyond these three problem domains.
I speculate that naive algorithms in a given problem domain contain the best
operations for failure shaping. Scalably robust algorithms only experience a small
amount of output error for every given internal failure. When a naive algorithm
is paired with an input generator, operation failure mode, and error measure that
is provably scalably robust, then we are likely to observe criticality behavior that
can be successfully failure shaped on more efficient algorithms in the same problem
domain. However, the replication of operations limits this hypothesis, as articulated
by Theorem 1 where arbitrary lgf (N ) operation replication implies that even strict
correctness is always scalably robust. Another limit on this hypothesis is the lack of
a formal definition for ‘naive’ algorithms in a problem domain.

7.2.5

Numerical Stability

Beyond leverage, the criticality results for matrix multiplication may also have an
interesting connection to questions of numerical stability. Strassen’s algorithm, also
called “fast matrix multiply”, is less numerically stable than naive matrix multiply [106]. As a result, it is less likely to be chosen for many computing tasks. I
hypothesize that efficient matrix multiplication algorithms are unstable because their
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internal leverage scales up the effects of small rounding errors in return for faster run
times. In the case of Strassen’s algorithm, this appears to occur during the 2nd , 3rd ,
and 5th recursive steps.

7.2.6

When Will Criticality Structures Scale Effectively?

In both matrix and scalar multiplication we see the similar criticality structures at
multiple scales. In Karatsuba multiplication the criticality graphs present a three
maxima pattern at multiple scales while in Strassen’s matrix multiplication there are
criticality spikes at failures points 2/7, 3/7, and 5/7 of the way through the algorithm at multiple input scales. These similarities suggest that small scale criticality
experimental results may be useful in evaluating larger scale programs.

7.3

Limitations of the Study

The important limitations of this study include:

• The focus on a limited number of fallible operations for each problem
domain.
The choice to limit the scale of this dissertation to the constrained reliability allocation problem—which focuses on operations that only produce output
errors, not program crashes or infinite loops—led to the focus on a limited
number of operations per algorithm. However, even though the type of operations that were studied were limited, I focused on operations that do a great
percentage of the work of a program—those operations that tend to be used
to analyze program efficiency. Further, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, there
is reason to believe that in the future it will be possible to constrain resources
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at specific failure points and ‘green/white’ computing imagines a world where
only some program operations are allowed to fail [26].
• The focus on i.i.d. failure distributions at the cost of exploring more
complex models that make use of coordinated failures.
As stated in Section 2.7, one of the ideas of this dissertation is that coordination at one level of computation leads to randomization at another level.
Rather than focusing on coordinated failures at the hardware level, I have instead focused on i.i.d. failures at the program level that can only be created by
coordinated failures beneath the program level. However, this move deals with
coordinated hardware failures by assuming they will have a particular effect
rather than by showing they have that effect. Future studies should examine
the actual impact of coordinated hardware failures on programs at run time. I
present ideas for future work in this direction in the next section.
• The choice of a simple error economization.
The error economization I’ve used in this thesis is very simple, each percentage
point decrease in epsilon for one operation has the exact same costs as a percent
point decrease in epsilon anywhere else. Operations can freely substitute their
resources for another operation’s resources. This approximation will only be
good for some real world situations. More complicated error economizations
that take into account the downstream costs of failed chip timings or that more
closely track the interaction between operation error and energy are necessary.
• The choice of a simple failure redistribution policy.
In this dissertation I have chosen to redistribute failure resources from operations with criticalities beneath the median to those above the median. This is a
very simple redistribution scheme, however, and may not be the most efficient
policy for failure redistribution. Specifically, I ignore statistical and continuous
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methods of failure redistribution that may produce better outcomes. I address
this weakness in the next section in future work.
• The use of simple failure modes that are not necessarily representative of the behavior of real world SDCs.
In this thesis I made use of handcrafted ‘failure modes’ that will not always
track the behavior of real world SDCs. This included flipping the output of
a comparison operation and a check operation, and randomly flipping a single
bit in the output of an add or multiplication operation. In future work I will
propose a path of study to address this limitation of the work.
• Limited set of problems explored.
This study is limited to the sorting, scalar multiplication, and matrix multiplication problem domains. Any empirical study will be limited to some problem
areas, but empirical evidence from others would still be welcome. In future
work I will present other potential problem domains.
• A lack of proofs concerning some (sorting algorithm, error measure)
tuples in Chapter 6 and about programs outside of the sorting problem domain.
The proofs in Chapter 6 are interesting since they show that looser definitions of
‘correct’ lead to a greater tendency to achieve average case scalable robustness.
However, the relationship between scalable robustness and program efficiency
within the program-error tuples that seem closest to the transition boundary
between scalably robust and not scalably robust is still poorly understood.
Further, outside of a few general statements about the relationship between
worst and average case scalable robustness, and the use of modular redundancy
in scalable robustness, this work is limited to sorting. I address both of these
weaknesses in future work.
• The limited scale of the empirical study.
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Due to the run time of the criticality assessment procedure, as presented in
this thesis, it was not possible to collect criticality data concerning very large
program instances. However, in future work I will present some possible paths
forward on this question.

7.4

Future Work

I find seven major possible research paths moving forward: Expanded empirical
studies that seek criticality assessments and error economizations on unaddressed
domains, scaling of the criticality assessment technique through search-based techniques, scaling of the criticality assessment technique through machine learning attribution models, studies of hardware behavior that can be used to inform operation
failure modes, spatial graphs for coordinated failure models, the development of
stochastic and continuous failure redistribution policies, and theoretical work that
moves beyond the sorting domain.

7.4.1

Expanded Empirical Studies

The empirical studies presented in this dissertation include the sorting, scalar multiplication, and matrix multiplication problem domains. While the techniques presented here have found interesting results in these domains, this is still a limited data
set. Empirical studies of criticality should be expanded into new domains such as
compression, graph problems such as max flow or min cut, and database operations.

7.4.2

Scaling Through Search

Failure shaping currently requires significant human labor. Making it more efficient will involve leveraging multiple strategies. One strategy includes a library of
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standardized input types, error measures, and failure interfaces that can be used to
produce annotated programs in the future.
Such a strategy, though, will tend to increase the computational resources required by the method. The programs I have presented are sufficiently limited that
they can be characterized relatively cheaply, but larger programs will be more difficult to explore. My observation of apparently similar failure shapes at multiple
scales (see Figure 5.11—page 79) suggests one strategy could be to scale the criticality assessment by run time in some programs. However, we will also need more
sophisticated search methods—ones capable of performing significant generalization
across failure points, rather than gathering fully-independent statistics as I have here.
Genetic algorithms, genetic programming, and other adaptive search procedures
are often employed to search combinatoric spaces, as in [107–109]. A common problem in this space is the flag variable problem [110]. In [111], the authors note that
GAs work best in search spaces that avoid these “needle-in-the-haystack” spikes. My
use of continuous error measures compared to typical all-or-none test failures may
help produce such ‘softened’ search space gradients, as medium-criticality operations
tend to cluster around spikes both here and in other algorithms we have explored [2].
This is a new area, but a relatively sparse set of data-points plus a suitable
heuristic search procedure may allow us to build imperfect but high-quality criticality
estimators for the failures of much larger pieces of software than are reachable via
Monte Carlo search alone.

7.4.3

Machine Learning and Attribution

Another possible path forward for failure shaping involves the use of deep learning
attribution models [112] paired with a shallow error study at a some low . Deep
learning is a machine learning technique that learns layers of mappings from inputs,
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represented as vectors of floating point numbers, to outputs represented the same
way. These mappings are represented as a series of non-linear functions from vectors
to vectors, where each dimension in an output vector is a linear combination of
dimensions on the input, followed by non-linear activation functions such as tanh,
relu, or a logistic function.
The original inspiration for deep learning are neural networks found in biological
systems, where a combined linear step and non-linear activation function is often
conceived as being similar to a single neuron. A good mapping over the entire network
is found through a process of gradient descent, where inputs are mapped through
the network, a potentially erroneous output is calculated, the distance between the
erroneous output and the correct results is then evaluated, and then the internal
weights of each neuron are modified by a derivative that is roughly equivalent to
each neuron’s contribution to the final erroneous output value.
One of the difficulties with a deep learning model, however, involves attributing
the model’s reasoning about output values to specific input dimensions. However,
a method called integrated gradients has recently been proven to have a number of
useful properties for attribution assignment and has been used to find attributions
that seem reasonable in a number of deep learning models [113].
It may be possible to use a method like integrated gradients to perform criticality
evaluations at large scale. If we treat a failure pattern as the input and the final
error as the output we may then be able to train a deep learning model on a constant
number of program instances with some reasonably small i.i.d. background failure
rate. This represents a speed up of the method as it will no longer be necessary to
perform a large number of simulations for each individual computational step. After
the model is trained, we can then attribute the final output error results to each
of the operations, evaluating which operations are most important in determining
output error.
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Hardware Failure Studies

A comparative study that looks at the effect of hardware failures introduced by
lower energy usage could be useful to fill the gaps in our knowledge concerning the
failure modes of deterministic operations used by algorithms. These studies could
be enhanced by looking at major virtualization techniques, such at the JVM, that
may introduce even further changes in the distribution of likely failure modes for a
give operation. Reasonable failure modes may be composed by combining the likely
behavior of a given hardware system with the likely behavior of the software stack
sitting above hardware.

7.4.5

Spatial Graphs for Coordinated Failures

In the current study only i.i.d. and worst case failure models are presented. In the
future it would be useful to see models that increase or decrease individual operation
failure rates based on the failure of nearby operations as in [78]. In that work,
comparison failures were coordinated if they were close to each other in time. Similar
models that make use of operation neighbor graphs to coordinate failures may be
used to surpass the i.i.d. paradigm. Such coordination graphs may place operations
close to each other if they have similar semantics, operate on the same CPU, or are
close to each other in time.

7.4.6

Stochastic and Continuous Failure Redistribution Policies

In this work I used a simplified failure redistribution policy that redirected resources
from operations with criticalities beneath the median to those with criticalities above
the median. This policy improved algorithmic robustness, however there is no a pri-
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ori reason to think this is the most efficient policy for failure shaping. Alternative
policies might include redirecting resources stochastically using continuous probability distributions based on operation criticality and other information as opposed to
the deterministic decision process used in this work.

7.4.7

Scalable Robustness Beyond Sorting

In this dissertation I have presented a generalized concept of scalable robustness,
paired with proofs that expose the behavior of a number of sorting algorithms considered in the light of the scalable robustness paradigm. These proofs suggest an
interesting relationship between error measure, algorithm efficiency, and robustness.
However, further research paths may be opened by theoretical work on the scalable
robustness of programs outside the sorting domain.

7.5

Significance

Here I summarize the contributions of this work:
1. This work helps uncover failure dynamics in complex pieces of code by outlining
a method for their consistent discovery. It does this by pointing out the need
for error measures that evaluate output quality instead of hard correctness
measures. Further, it begins the process of building a body of failure modes
for the purposes of examining the dynamics of failures inside of computations.
2. This work aids in the armoring of computations against internal failures by
providing a measure of each operational instance’s criticality. Given this information, it is a small step to see that computational architects can choose to
armor only those operational instances with a great deal of criticality, thus reducing the cost of building robust computations. This allows computational ar-
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chitects to make choices between heavily armored, robust computations which
require a great deal of resources and less armored highly efficient computations
that pass a greater number of failures through to their outputs. This extends
the green/white approach to energy saving through approximate computing,
allowing for subtle gradations of failure-approximation that depend on specific
algorithmic behavior.
3. This work provides researchers with a new view on the internal workings of
algorithms. This view may provide computer scientists with new methods for
classifying and identifying and teaching algorithms.
4. In modern computer systems, built on large deterministic hardware, functional
modules are often designed, deployed, and composed with virtually no knowledge of the overall system behavior. This dissertation’s fourth contribution is
the notion of method level failure interfaces that allow the study of approximate
computations separate from their underlying hardware stack, either freeing us
from the need for specialized hardware knowledge, or at least allowing us to
compile that knowledge in a separate process.
5. Unlike traditional approaches that use fault tolerance to reduce or eliminate
failures, I have a ‘hardware reliability budget’ that treats failure rates as an
independent variable: guaranteeing that failures cannot be avoided. This dissertation moves beyond fault-tolerance/intolerance by dealing with reliability
resource allocation when those resources are not sufficient for strictly correct
algorithmic results.
6. The theoretical views provided in this work are the first treatment, to my
knowledge, that considers the robustness of an algorithm as input sizes grow
infinitely while error rates approach zero. One major advance introduced by
this perspective is Theorem 1 (page 1) which shows a bound on the maximum
redundancy needed to ensure the correct operation of a program given an i.i.d.
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failure model. The proofs relating sorting algorithm efficiency, error measure,
and scalable robustness are also suggestive of a previously unobserved theory
of failure dynamics.

7.6

Conclusion

The work presented in this dissertation is both incomplete and exciting. The relationships I have observed—between program operation failures and program output
error—are related to both known, and newly discovered, algorithmic behaviors and
properties. This is especially true for program efficiency, which impacts whether
particular algorithms can be considered robust at all. This work also shows that
these relationships can be leveraged to improve algorithmic behavior in the face of
failure-prone hardware or even in the face of other sources of error, such as rounding.
The possibilities seem boundless when we peer behind the barrier imposed by strict
correctness.
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[100] P. Gács and A. Gál, “Lower bounds for the complexity of reliable boolean
circuits with noisy gates,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 40,
no. 2, pp. 579–583, 1994.
[101] P. L. Chebyshev, “Des valeurs moyennes,” J. Math. Pures Appl., vol. 12,
pp. 177–184, 1867.
[102] W. D. Orcutt, Official Lawn Tennis Bulletin, vol. 4. The Editors, 1897.
[103] M. T. Goodrich, “Spin-the-bottle sort and annealing sort: Oblivious sorting via
round-robin random comparisons,” Algorithmica, vol. 68, no. 4, pp. 835–858,
2014.
[104] T. H. Cormen, C. E. Leiserson, R. L. Rivest, and C. Stein, “Introduction to
algorithms second edition,” 2001.
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